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E X E C U T I V E  S U M M A RY
The contribution of the harvest sector of the world’s marine fisheries to the
global economy is substantially smaller than it could be. The lost economic
benefits are estimated to be on the order of $50 billion annually. Over the past
three decades, this cumulative global loss of potential economic benefits is on
the order of $2 trillion. The losses represent the difference between the potential
and actual net economic benefits from global marine fisheries. 
By improving governance of marine fisheries, society could capture a sub-
stantial part of this $50 billion annual economic loss. Through comprehensive
reform, the fisheries sector could become a basis for economic growth and the
creation of alternative livelihoods in many countries. At the same time, a nation’s
natural capital in the form of fish stocks could be greatly increased and the
negative impacts of the fisheries on the marine environment reduced. 
In economic terms, some 60 percent of the world’s marine fish stocks were
“underperforming assets” in 1974, the year when the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) initiated its reports on the state of the world’s marine fish
stocks. By 2004, more than 75 percent of the fish stocks were underperform-
ing, at an estimated annual loss of $50 billion to the global economy. The
“sunken billions” is a conservative estimate of this loss. The estimate excludes
consideration of losses to recreational fisheries and to marine tourism and
losses attributable to illegal fishing are not included. The estimate also excludes
consideration of the economic contribution of dependent activities such as
fish processing, distribution, and consumption. It excludes the value of biodi-
versity losses and any compromise to the ocean carbon cycle. These exclusions
suggest that the losses to the global economy from unsustainable exploitation
of living marine resources substantially exceed $50 billion per year. 
For over three decades, the world’s marine fish stocks have come under
increasing pressure from fishing, from loss of habitats, and from pollution. Rising
sea temperatures and the increasing acidity of the oceans are placing further
stress on already stressed ecosystems. Illegal fishing and unreported catches
undermine fishery science, while subsidies continue to support unsustainable
fishing practices.
THE STATE OF MARINE FISH STOCKS AND FISHERIES
The global marine catch has been stagnant for over a decade, while the natural
fish capital—the wealth of the oceans—has declined. FAO reports that an
increasing proportion of the world’s marine fish stocks is either fully exploited or
overexploited. Most of the world’s most valuable fish stocks are either fully
exploited or overexploited. The 25 percent that remains underexploited tends to
consist of lower-value species or the least profitable fisheries for such stocks.
When fish stocks are fully exploited in the biological sense, the associated fisheries
are almost invariably performing below their economic optimum. In some cases,
fisheries may be biologically sustainable but still operate at an economic loss. For
example, the total catch may be effectively limited by regulations, but in a world
of increasing fuel subsidies, the real cost of harvesting the catch may exceed the
landed value. The depletion in fish capital resulting from overexploitation is
rarely reflected in the reckoning of a nation’s overall capital and GDP growth.
This study and previous studies indicate that the current marine catch
could be achieved with approximately half of the current global fishing effort.
In other words, there is massive overcapacity in the global fleet. The excess
fleets competing for the limited fish resources result in stagnant productivity
and economic inefficiency. In response to the decline in physical productivity,
the global fleet has attempted to maintain profitability by reducing labor costs,
lobbying for subsidies, and increasing investment in technology. Partly as a
result of the poor economic performance, real income levels of fishers remain
depressed as the costs per unit of harvest have increased. Although the recent
changes in food and fuel prices have altered the fishery economy, over the past
decade real landed fish prices have stagnated, exacerbating the problem. The
value of the marine capture seafood production at the point of harvest is some
20 percent of the $400 billion global food fish market. The market strength of
processors and retailers and the growth of aquaculture, which now accounts
for some 50 percent of food fish production, have contributed to downward
pressure on producer prices.
THE ESTIMATE OF THE “SUNKEN BILLIONS”
In technical terms, this study estimates the loss of potential economic rent in
the global fishery. For the purposes of this study, economic rent is considered
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broadly equivalent to net economic benefits, which is the term used throughout
most of the report. The lost benefits, or the difference between the potential
and actual net benefits, can be largely attributed to two factors. First, depleted
fish stocks mean that there are simply fewer fish to catch and therefore that the
cost of catching is greater than it could be. Second, the massive fleet overca-
pacity, often described as “too many fishers chasing too few fish,” means that
the potential benefits are also dissipated through excessive fishing effort. 
This study estimated the difference between the potential and actual net eco-
nomic benefits from global marine fisheries using 2004 as the base year. The esti-
mate was made using a model that aggregated the world’s highly diverse fisheries
into a single fishery. This made it possible to use the available global fisheries data
such as production, value of production, and global fisheries profits as inputs to
the model. Some of the global data sets and inputs required for the model are
either deficient or less than robust. Consequently, several further assumptions
were required, and in each case the rationale behind the assumption is provided.
For example, based on available estimates, the maximum sustainable (biological)
yield from the world’s fisheries was assumed to be 95 million metric tons (tons).
To account for the inherent uncertainties in the data and the simplification in the
model, estimates of the most likely range of lost economic benefits were obtained
using sensitivity analyses and stochastic simulations.
For the base year, 2004, the 95 percent confidence interval for the lost eco-
nomic benefits in the global marine fishery was found to be between $26 billion
and $72 billion, with the most likely estimate to be on the order of $50 billion. 
The estimate of $50 billion—the sunken billions—does not take account of
several important factors and is thus a conservative estimate of the potential
losses. The model does not include the costs of fisheries management and does
not reflect the costs to the marine environment and biodiversity resulting from
weak fisheries governance. The model does not fully capture the costs of sub-
sidies, or the benefits that would result from efficient fisheries that would favor
the least-cost producers. Nor does the model capture the potential downstream
economic benefits of more efficient fisheries. The estimate does not count the
benefits from recreational fisheries, from marine tourism, or from healthy
coral reefs. The estimate is consistent with previous studies, however, and the
study provides a replicable and verifiable baseline for future tracking of the
economic health of marine fisheries.
The real cumulative global loss of net benefits from inefficient global fish-
eries during the 1974–2008 period is estimated at $2.2 trillion. To derive the
$2.2 trillion value, the estimated loss of $50 billion in 2004 was used as a base
value to construct a time series of losses. The 1974–2008 period was used
because the FAO produced its first “state of the marine fisheries” report in
1974, the first of a series of 14 such reports. The changing proportion of
global fish stocks reported as fully or overexploited in this series was used to
build the annual loss estimate. An opportunity cost of capital of 3.5 percent
was assumed.
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CAPTURING THE SUNKEN BILLIONS
The depletion of a nation’s fish stocks constitutes a loss of the nation’s stock
of natural capital and thus a loss of national wealth. The depletion of global
fish stocks constitutes a loss of global natural capital. Economically healthy
marine fisheries can deliver a sustainable flow of economic benefits, a natural
bounty from good stewardship, rather than being a net drain on society and
on global wealth.
Recovery of the sunken billions can take place in two main ways. First, a
reduction in fishing effort can rapidly increase productivity, profitability, and
net economic benefits from a fishery. Second, rebuilding fish stocks will lead to
increased sustainable yields and lower fishing costs. Some fish stocks can
rebuild rapidly, but the uncertain dynamics of marine ecosystems means that
certain stocks may not be readily rebuilt. One such example is the Canadian
cod stocks, which, despite a reduction in fishing effort, have not recovered. 
The crisis in the world’s marine fisheries is not only a fisheries problem, but
one of the political economy of reform. Fisheries reform requires broad-based
political will founded on a social consensus. Building such a consensus may
take time and may require forging a common vision that endures changes of
governments. Experience shows that successful reforms may also require
champions or crises to catalyze the process. Fisheries reform will require
reduction in fishing effort and fleet capacity. Thus, successful reforms should
take the time to build consensus among fishers on the transition pathways,
make provisions for creating alternative economic opportunities, establish
social safety nets for affected fishers, and generally manage transition in an
equitable manner. Successful reforms will require strengthening of marine
tenure systems, equitable sharing of benefits from fisheries, and curtailment of
illegal fishing. Successful reforms will require reduction or elimination of per-
nicious subsidies in the transition to sustainability. 
Rising food prices and a growing fish food gap for over 1 billion people
dependent on fish as their primary source of protein add to the rationale for
fishery reform. Rising fuel prices and the need for greater resilience in marine
ecosystems in the face of growing pressures from climate change reinforce the
arguments for concerted national and international actions to rebuild fish
wealth. The heavy carbon footprint of some fisheries and emerging evidence
that depletion of marine fisheries may have undermined the ocean carbon
cycle add to the justification for fisheries reform. The depletion of global fish
stocks cannot, however, be attributed solely to fishing. Pollution, habitat
destruction, invasive species, and climate change all play a role in this process. 
THE COSTS OF REFORM
Comprehensive reform of marine fisheries governance can capture a substantial 
proportion of the sunken billions. The transition to economically healthy
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fisheries will require political will to implement reforms that incur political,
social, and economic costs. These are the costs of investing in rebuilding fish
stocks, which requires an initial reduction in fishing activity and harvest rates.
The benefits of this investment accrue later when fish stocks have grown and
when fishing fleets have adjusted. Once recovered, many ocean fisheries can
generate a substantial economic surplus and turn a net economic loss to soci-
ety into a significant driver of economic growth and a basis for alternative
livelihood opportunities. However, the social, economic, and institutional costs
of this transition must be financed. The allocation of this cost burden between
public and private sectors presents challenges both to fiscal policy and man-
agement practice.
The most critical reform is the effective removal of the open access condi-
tion from marine capture fisheries and the institution of secure marine tenure
and property rights systems. Reforms in many instances would also involve the
reduction or removal of subsidies that create excess fishing effort and fishing
capacity. Reduction or removal of subsidies can, however, cause undesirable
economic and social hardship, especially at a time when fishers face volatile
prices of fuel and food. Subsidies that create perverse incentives for greater
investment and fishing effort in overstressed fisheries tend to reinforce the sec-
tor’s poverty trap and prevent the creation of economic surplus that can be
invested in alternatives, including education and health. The World Bank has
suggested that any subsidies should be temporary, as part of a broader strategy
to improve fisheries management and enhance productivity. Rather than sub-
sidies, the World Bank has emphasized investment in quality public goods such
as science, infrastructure, and human capital, in good governance of natural
resources, and in an improved investment climate.
The alternative to reform—business as usual—is a continued decline in
global fish wealth, harvest operations that become increasingly inefficient, and
growing poverty in fishery-dependent communities. Failure to act implies
increased risks of fish stock collapses, increasing political pressure for subsi-
dies, and a sector that, rather than being a net contributor to global wealth, is
an increasing drain on society.
THE BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC HEALTH OF FISHERIES
The focus on the declining biological health of the world’s fisheries has
tended to obscure the even more critical deterioration of the economic
health of the fisheries, which stems from poor governance and is both a cause
and a result of the biological overexploitation. Economically healthy fisheries
are fundamental to achieving accepted goals for the fisheries sector, such as
improved livelihoods, food security, increased exports, and the restoration of
fish stocks, which is a key objective of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development Plan of Implementation. This study makes the economic case
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for comprehensive reform of fisheries governance and complements ecological
and conservation arguments.
Many national and international fishery objectives focus on maintaining or
increasing capture fishery production, and it is argued that national policies
would benefit from a greater focus on maximizing net benefits and choosing
economic or social yield as an objective rather than continuing to manage fish-
eries with maximum sustainable yield as an objective. Such a socioeconomic
focus implies that planners and decision makers devote greater attention to
reform of the pernicious incentive structures driving fisheries overexploitation.
A clear picture of the economic health of fisheries is fundamental to build-
ing the economic sustainability necessary to conserve and rebuild fish stocks.
Such a health check needs to take account of subsidies, environmental exter-
nalities, and depletion of fish capital, and underpins any coherent policy
debate on fishery reform. 
NET BENEFITS AND TENURE
It has long been understood that because the benefits from fish harvests are to
individuals but costs of resource reduction are shared, the net benefits from
use of common pool resources, such as fish stocks, will tend to be dissipated.
In many countries, marine fishery resources are considered to belong to the
nation, and governments are charged with stewardship of this public asset.
This has in some instances undermined the traditional rights systems observed
by local communities and led to a de facto open access condition. The public,
or common pool, character of marine fish resources is often deeply embedded
in law and practice, so strengthening marine fisheries tenure is a complex
undertaking and faces political, social, and legal challenges. It will require good
understanding of traditional or de facto fishing rights systems and of the func-
tionality and legitimacy of national fisheries legislation as a basis for bridging
the divide between community and national stewardship functions.
It is not the role of this study to be prescriptive with regard to marine fish-
eries tenure but to raise awareness of the link between tenure and net benefits
and to suggest that avoidance of the sensitive issues of marine use rights is
likely to result in a continued slide toward poverty for many fishery-dependent
communities. Reforms will require empowerment of poor fisher communities,
establishment of secure user and property rights, and investment in collective
action by a strengthened civil society. In a world of volatile fuel and food
prices, any apparent advantage held by small-scale fisheries also needs to be
supported by a greater investment in the management of small-scale fisheries.
These are among the many reasons why the economic objectives—increas-
ing the net benefits and wealth from fisheries—need to be at center stage in
efforts to resolve the crisis in marine fisheries. Public awareness and under-
standing of the potential and actual flows of economic benefits can inform the
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political economy of reform and help leaders move toward socially responsible
and sustainable fisheries underpinned by sound scientific advice. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Use the results of this study to raise awareness among leaders, stakeholders,
and the public of the potential economic and social benefits from
improved fisheries governance in contrast to the sector’s current drain on
society in many countries.
2. Promote country- and fishery-level estimates of the potential economic
and social benefits of fisheries reform and assessment of the social and
political costs of reform as a basis for national- or fishery-level dialogue.
3. Build a portfolio of experiences in the process of fisheries reform with a
focus on the political economy of reform and the design of the reform
process, including consideration of the timing and financing of reform
and structuring a national dialogue on the reform process. Fisheries
reform initiatives should draw on the knowledge and lessons of reforms in
other sectors, in particular with regard to the impact on the poor and the
effectiveness and equity of adjustment mechanisms.
4. Progressively identify a portfolio of reform pathways based on a consensus
vision for the future of a fishery and founded on transparency in the distri-
bution of benefits and social equity in reforms. The common elements of
such pathways could include effective stakeholder consultation processes;
sound social and economic justifications for change; and an array of social
and technical options, including decentralization and comanagement initia-
tives to create more manageable fishery units. A reform process will bend
the trusted tools of fisheries management to new tasks. Sound scientific
advice, technical measures such as closed seasons, and effective registration
of vessels are likely to form synergies with poverty reduction strategies, tran-
sitions out of fisheries, social safety nets, and community comanagement.
5. Review fiscal policies to phase out subsidies that enhance fishing effort
and fishing capacity and redirect public support measures toward
strengthening fisheries management capacities and institutions, while
avoiding social and economic hardships in the fisheries reform process.
6. In an effort to comply with the call of the World Summit on Sustainable
Development Plan of Implementation for restoration of fish stocks, coun-
tries could, on a timely basis, provide to their public an assessment of the
state of national fish stocks and take measures to address the underreport-
ing or misreporting of catches. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xxiii

1.1  INTRODUCTION
Economically healthy fisheries are fundamental to achieving acceptedgoals for the fisheries sector, such as improved livelihoods, exports andfood security, and the restoration of fish stocks, which is a key objective
of the Plan of Implementation adopted at the World Summit on Sustainable
Development in Johannesburg in 2002. Many national and international fishery
objectives focus on maintaining or increasing the quantity of capture fishery
production while less attention is devoted to the economic health of fisheries. 
An analysis of key global trends in fisheries—including fish production
and consumption, the state of the fish stocks, and employment in the sector—
provides the context and builds a profile of the economic health of the world’s
marine fisheries. Estimates of the economic value of global marine fishery
production and costs of production are used as inputs to an aggregate
 economic model to derive a range of estimates of potential economic rents
lost, largely as a result of suboptimal governance of the marine fisheries
worldwide. Key assumptions underlying the model are described.
1.1.1  Purpose and Outcomes of the Study
The purpose of this study is to raise the awareness of decision makers regard-
ing the economic dimensions of the crisis in the world’s marine capture fish-
eries. The target group includes not only fisheries professionals, many of whom
grapple with this crisis on a daily basis, but a broader audience of policy and
decision makers who can foster reforms in fisheries with a view to rebuilding
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fish wealth and capital as a basis for economic growth and biologically and eco-
nomically healthy fisheries. 
The study shows that, in aggregate, the global marine fisheries in the base
year, 2004, represent a net economic loss to society and often a poverty trap for
dependent communities. The study shows that if marine capture fisheries were
organized to move fisheries in the direction of maximizing economic effi-
ciency, then national fisheries sectors, fishing communities, and society as a
whole would reap substantial economic benefits. The political, social, and eco-
nomic costs of such reforms are briefly discussed. 
1.1.2  Structure of the Study
Chapter 1 provides an overview of trends in global fisheries to set the context
for the study.
Chapter 2 describes the economic performance of the world’s capture fish-
eries. The study reviews the main determinants for the economic performance
of global fisheries, such as the value of fish production, the cost of factors of
production, and productivity trends. The available global data sets are
described as a framework for selection of the parameters used in the model.
Fisheries are shown to benefit from significant subsidies that often undermine
sustainability and maintain inefficiency. Illegal fishing is recognized as a gov-
ernance failure undermining the economic and biological health of fisheries.
Substantial additional work is suggested to remove uncertainties with respect
to the magnitude of unrecorded catches at the global level.
Chapter 3 presents the approach and method used to build a bioeconomic
model of the aggregate global fishery. Additional technical details of the model are
provided in the appendixes.
Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis, highlighting the poor eco-
nomic health of the world’s marine fisheries and the need for greater attention
to improving the economic well-being of fisheries and fishers: as a sustainable
source of economic growth, as a pathway out of poverty, as a means of con-
tributing to food security, and as a way to build resilience to the impending
effects of climate change.
Chapter 5 discusses the results and draws on available case studies to identify
key elements in moving fisheries toward a more economically rational base with-
out sacrificing fundamental social objectives in pursuit of economic efficiency.
Four appendixes provide supplementary information.
1.2  THE DETERIORATING STATE OF THE MARINE 
FISHERY RESOURCES
The crisis in marine fisheries has been well documented in biological terms.
This study focuses on the economic health of the world’s fisheries as a com-
plement to the numerous reviews of the ecological state of the global marine
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fisheries. Globally, the proportion of fully exploited, and either  overexploited,
depleted, or recovering fish stocks has continued to increase from just above 50
percent of all assessed fish stocks in the mid-1970s to about 75 percent in 2005
(box 1.1) (FAO 2006). This indicates that, in economic terms, more than 75
percent of the world’s fisheries are underperforming or are subject to eco-
nomic overfishing. In 1974, about 40 percent of the assessed stocks were rated
as underexploited or moderately exploited. By 2005, this percentage had fallen
to 25 percent (FAO 2007c). 
Between 1950 and 1970, the recorded catch of both the demersal (bottom-
dwelling) and pelagic species (species that live in the upper layers of the sea)
GLOBAL TRENDS IN FISHERIES 3
The box figure indicates that the reported global marine catch has stagnated
at a level of 80–85 million tons since 1990. This stagnation hides several
underlying trends in the composition of the catch as described below.
One-half of the marine capture fish stocks monitored by the FAO are des-
ignated as fully exploited, producing at or close to their maximum sustainable
yield. Another 25 percent of the marine fish stocks are either overexploited,
depleted, or recovering from depletion and are yielding less than their maxi-
mum sustainable yield (FAO 2007c). The remaining 25 percent of the marine
capture fish stocks are underexploited or moderately exploited, and although
this implies that more could be produced, many of these underexploited
stocks are low-value species or species for which harvesting may be uneco-
nomical. Global production of seafood from wild stocks is at or close to its
long-run biological maximum. 
Box 1.1  Stagnating Global Marine Catch
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grew considerably (figure 1.1). Since 1970, demersal fish catches have stabilized
at around 20 million tons a year, while pelagic catches grew to a peak volume
of almost 44 million tons in 1994. Since then, annual pelagic catches have fluc-
tuated between 36 and 41 million tons. 
Thus, the global fish supply from marine capture fisheries increasingly
relies on lower-value species characterized by large fluctuations in year-to-
year productivity, concealing the slow degradation of the demersal high-
value resources. About 17 percent of the global catch reported to FAO by
member countries is not reported by species group. Thus, the FAO’s FishStat
Plus database does not readily allow assessment of these species composi-
tion changes on a global basis. This change in the species composition of the
catch is commonly referred to as “fishing down marine food webs” (Pauly et
al. 1998). The stagnant level of production is thus maintained by the rela-
tively higher growth rate of a higher proportion of smaller fish species lower
on the food web and a likely decrease in the average age of the catch, which
jointly contribute to maintaining fish biomass. In some fisheries, the targets
of fishing have also expanded to cover an entire spectrum of species in the
ecosystem “fishing through the food webs” (Essington, Beaudreau, and
 Weidenmann 2006). 
The changing patterns of discards (fish caught but dumped unwanted at sea)
also suggests that the global catch now comprises substantial quantities of lower-
value, previously discarded fish: the amount of fish discarded may have decreased
by over 10 million tons between 1994 and 2004 (Kelleher 2005). For example, the
quantity of so-called trash fish used for aquaculture feed is estimated to be 5–7
million tons (Tacon 2006; APFIC 2006). There is also growing evidence that the
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Figure 1.1  Catch of Selected Species Groups in Marine Fisheries 
Source: FAO FishStat Plus. 
biomass of large predatory fishes has declined substantially from preindustrialized
levels in many regions (Myers and Worm 2003; Ahrens and Walters 2005),
although this may not hold true for all fisheries (Sibert et al. 2006).
Climatic variability has always been a significant determinant of fish stock
growth and decline, and response to variability is part of the daily business
of fishing. However, climate change, as described by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007), is placing additional stress on fish-
eries already stressed by pollution, habitat loss, and fishing pressure.
Although recent studies on coral reefs (Baird et al. 2007) and reviews of the
likely impacts of climate change on the fisheries of the North Atlantic pro-
vide important guidance on trends, in the case of developing countries, the
impact of changes in sea temperature and ocean acidity on their fish stocks
remains largely undetermined. Similarly, the impact of sea-level rise and
erratic climatic events on the community and household wealth of coastal
fishing populations remains largely unquantified. These added ecological,
environmental, and economic stresses caused by climate change add to the
urgency and economic justification for restoring the resilience and health of
fish stocks (FAO 2008; European Commission 2007; Sustainable Fisheries
Livelihoods Project 2007).
1.3  PROFILE AND TRENDS IN GLOBAL FISHERIES
PRODUCTION
In 2006, total reported world fishery production (excluding aquatic plants)
reached almost 160 million tons (figure 1.2), of which 53 percent originates
from marine capture fisheries. Over the past 20 years, the continued growth in
world fish production is largely attributable to aquaculture (see figure 1.2). 
China is the largest producing country, contributing 49 million tons in
2005, of which 32 million tons are from aquaculture (figure 1.3). Developing
countries have contributed more than one-half of total capture fish pro-
duction since 1990 (figure 1.4) and this share reached more than two-thirds
in 2005.
1.4  TRADE AND FISH CONSUMPTION
Rising demand for fish has been a major driver of increased fishing effort.
Spurred by the globalization of markets for fish, some 37 percent of global fish
production flows into international trade, making fish one of the most traded
“agricultural” commodities and accounting for up to 13 percent of global
“agricultural” trade. The benefits of increasing globalization in fish trade have
nevertheless been reduced by growing overexploitation because ineffective
governance of fisheries has allowed the depletion of fish stocks—the natural
capital, or fish wealth (ICTSD 2006).
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In 2006, total world trade of fish and fishery products reached a record
(export) value of $86.4 billion, more than a 10-fold increase since 1976, when
global fish trade statistics first became available. The share of developing coun-
tries in total fishery exports was 48 percent by value and 57 percent by quan-
tity. Growth in aquaculture production has been an important factor for the
global expansion of seafood trade. 
The growth in reported global fish production has more than kept pace
with population growth (figure 1.5). Based on the reported global fish
 production, the total amount of fish available for human consumption is
estimated to have reached 107 million tons in 2005, providing an average
6 THE SUNKEN BILLIONS
Figure 1.2 World Marine and Inland Capture and Aquaculture Production,
1950–2005 
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Figure 1.3  World Capture and Aquaculture Production, 1950–2005
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Figure 1.4  Total Recorded Marine Capture Production by Economic
Group, 1970–2005 
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global per capita fish supply of 16.5 kilograms, but with large differences
across regions and countries as well as within countries (FAO 2007c). These
global values, however, may not adequately reflect important subsistence
fish consumption and consumption of unreported commercial production
from small-scale fisheries.
Figure 1.5  World Population and Global Fish Supply, 1970–2003
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Figure 1.6  Regional Trends in Annual Fish Supply, 1961–2003
4.0
8.0
12.0
16.0
K
ilo
gr
am
s 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
20.0
1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
Africa South America
Asia Asia excl. China
Europe Global average
Source: FAO FishStat Plus; FAO 2007a. 
Aquaculture products continue to capture an increasing share of global mar-
kets for fish. This is driven by technological advances in production, relatively
lower production costs (compared with capture fisheries), and globalization of
fish trade. The competition from aquaculture places additional economic stress
on capture fisheries and contributes to trade disputes as farmed fish capture
market share from traditional producers.
Rising demand in China and Europe has largely driven the increase in aver-
age global per capita fish consumption (figure 1.6). This global increase was
particularly pronounced in the 1980s and 1990s but has since stabilized at
around 16 kilograms per capita per year (FAO 2007a). Per capita consump-
tion of fish in South America is stabilizing after a peak in 1995, but per capita
consumption in Africa and South America remains low (see figure 1.6). In
both regions, but especially in sub-Saharan Africa, low animal protein intake
is believed to be largely a result of low per capita incomes. Traditionally, low-
value fish and fishery products provide cheap protein to the poorer popula-
tions in these regions and in Asia. Africa is the only continent where per capita
fish consumption has been in decline (less than half the global average), and
because fish tends to be the lowest priced animal protein, this trend raises
concern about the nutritional quality of the diet, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa. Aquaculture production has responded to the increasing demand in
Asia. However, despite recent growth, African aquaculture has been unable to
respond to the continent’s nutritional needs. The increased demand for
aquaculture and livestock feeds based on trash fish and low-value species
has a potential negative impact on the availability and accessibility of these
products for direct human consumption (APFIC 2006). 
The economic performance of global marine capture fisheries is deter-mined by the quantity of fish caught, the price of fish, the harvestingcosts, and the productivity of the fisheries. The following sections sum-
marize the global profile of each of these determinant factors and discuss the
closely related issues of subsidies and excess capacity in the global fishing fleet.
2.1  VALUE OF PRODUCTION AND GLOBAL FISH PRICES
In 2004 (the base year for the study), the total nominal value1 of reported
global fish production was estimated at $148 billion, of which capture fisheries
was $85 billion and aquaculture was $63 billion. The total estimated value of
the reported marine catch of 85.7 million tons was $78.8 billion (FAO 2007c).2
2.1.1  Ex-vessel Prices
The nominal average ex-vessel price was $918 per metric ton for the reported
marine catch and $666 per ton for the reported inland (freshwater) catch. The
average farmgate price for cultured fish was $1,393 per ton. The higher unit
price for aquaculture products is a result of the production of high-value
species (for example, shrimp and salmon). The ex-vessel prices are considered
to be conservative and close to true market prices, being relatively free of taxes,
subsidies, and other market-distorting influences. 
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2.1.2  Export Prices
Fish price data sets are relatively incomplete at the global level: the primary
long-term price data series is the fish export unit value derived from FAO’s
FishStat Plus trade statistics. The unit value of exports may underestimate the
global trend in real fish prices. On the one hand, higher-value fish products
tend to be exported. On the other hand, aquaculture has a growing share in
world fish trade, and prices of many cultured species have tended to decline
from the initial elevated price levels.
Because of the changing product composition of exports, the export values
are only indicative of the price trends, but the values nevertheless show several
interesting features (see figure 2.1). There was a significant decline in fish
prices between 1978 and 1985, followed by a strong price rise from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, a gradual decline until 2001, and a recovery in prices
during the most recent years. The real unit value of exports in 2004 was no
higher than it was in the late 1980s. This strongly suggests that the global price
of fish in 2004 was not significantly different from that in the late 1980s. 
Setting aside numerous supply-driven real price fluctuations, the real prices
of many fish commodities saw little change between the early 1990s and late
2007 (Josupeit 2008, Asche and Bjørndal 1999). The notable exceptions are
increased fish meal and fish oil prices, which have been driven by higher
demand for meat and aquaculture products. Tuna prices and some whitefish
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Figure 2.1 Trends in the Nominal and Real Unit Export Value of Fishery
Products
Source: FAO FishStat Plus.
Note: The deflator used for real values is the U.S. producer price index for all commodities,
base year 1982 (Delgado et al. 2003). Values exclude aquatic plants.
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prices have also increased, while supplies from aquaculture have dampened
prices for some products. Fillet and product yields have improved, wastage has
been reduced, and supply chains shortened, making downstream industry
increasingly more efficient and competitive, often decreasing profit margins
for primary producers and intermediaries.
Thus, although the unit value of the aggregate reported catch has remained
relatively constant, the higher proportion of relatively lower-value “trash fish”
and small pelagic species is buoyed up by the increasing scarcity value of
species higher on the food web, such as lobster or grouper. The scarcity of some
higher-value species has created opportunities to fish in deeper waters, often at
a higher cost per unit of catch and also at a cost to the relatively unknown bio-
diversity of the continental slopes.
Growth in demand for fish is concentrated in developing countries where
populations and per capita incomes show strong growth. However, survey data
from China in the period 1980–2000 indicate only slight increases in the real
price of fish (Delgado et al. 2003). Recent studies show substantial increases in
Chinese seafood consumption with increases of over 100 percent in lower-
income households to over 150 percent for higher-income families between
1998 and 2005 (Pan Chenjun 2007). In contrast, while demand continues to
grow in the United States and real prices of fresh fish show a long-term increas-
ing trend, the price of the traditional frozen products and particularly of
canned products has declined during the last 30 years (figure 2.2). More
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Figure 2.2  Trends in U.S. Real Price Indexes for Fish and Seafood Products,
1947–2006
Source: Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2007. This is an update of figure 3.2
in Delgado et al. (2003). 
Note: 1982 is the base year (“1” on the y-axis).
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recently, a weakening U.S. dollar exchange rate and consumer spending may be
contributing to a recent decline in U.S. shrimp imports, a key seafood indica-
tor (Seafood International 2008).
2.1.3  Value of Intangibles
Healthy marine ecosystems generate a range of intangible values, which are
difficult to estimate in the absence of robust global data sets and agreed valu-
ation methods. These values arise from marine biodiversity, the existence
value of megafauna, and the value of environment services from natural assets
such as healthy reefs (Cesar 2000; UNEP-WCMC 2006; Worm et al. 2006).
There may be additional potential benefits from ocean carbon sequestration
resulting from healthy fish stocks (Lutz 2008). The global fishing fleet cur-
rently has substantial excess capacity, but a global fleet that is “in balance”
with the fish stocks can significantly reduce the carbon footprint of the indus-
try. The bioeconomic model used in this study does not include a valuation of
these intangibles. 
2.2  FISHING COSTS AND PRODUCTIVITY
There is no representative global data set on the costs of fishing. However,
costs and earnings studies are available from a number of countries and
fisheries. Fishing costs vary greatly by type of fishery and locality: for exam-
ple, trawl fisheries tend to have high fuel costs, while many smaller vessels
are nonmotorized and the cost of subsistence fishing may be little more than
the cost of the labor involved. In general, the major cost factors for most
fisheries are: 
■ labor (30–50 percent of total costs); 
■ fuel (10–25 percent); 
■ fishing gear (5–15 percent);
■ repair and maintenance (5–10 percent); and
■ capital cost, such as depreciation and interest (5–25 percent).
The trends in the costs of each of these factors of production are relevant
not only for an understanding of the historical trends in fisheries but also to
provide a basis for future projections of, for example, the effect of changing
fuel prices. Available cost data must be treated with some caution, because the
true cost data tend to be confounded by taxes and subsidies. There is ample evi-
dence that at the global level productivity has deteriorated, especially in recent
years, as the majority of producers incur higher fishing costs while the global
catch has remained stagnant.
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2.2.1  Fuel Prices and Productivity
The cost of crude oil not only directly relates to fishing fuel costs but also indi-
rectly affects the cost of fishing nets and lines and of vessel construction and
repair. Figure 2.3 shows an index of the real price of crude oil and an index of
the real material costs in U.S. ship building. For comparison purposes, the
index of the real unit value of fish exports is also illustrated. It shows that until
about mid-1980, real unit export value rose faster than crude oil and unit
material costs, but since the late 1980s price and cost trends have been fairly
similar, with the crude oil price climbing steeply since 2000. 
Since 2000, fuel subsidies have probably played an increasingly important
role in supporting the financial viability of fishing operations in some coun-
tries. Such fuel subsidies (mostly forgone taxes) to the fishing sector by gov-
ernments globally are estimated to be in the range of $4.2 billion to $8.5 billion
per year (Sumaila et al. 2008).
In the absence of productivity gains, figure 2.3 strongly suggests that the
economic performance of global marine fisheries is unlikely to have improved
since the early 1990s. Several factors continue to undermine productivity.
These include rising oil prices; rising costs of fishing gear and vessels, often
compounded by unfavorable exchange rates (for countries that import factors
THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF WORLD MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 13
Figure 2.3  Real Trends in Crude Oil Price, Vessel Material Costs, and Fish
Export Unit Value (1998 = 100) 
Source: FAO FishStat Plus; FAO FIEP; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration; http://www.coltoncompany.com/shipbldg/statistics/index.htm, based on
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Deflator used for real values: U.S. producer
price index for all commodities, base year 1982 (Delgado et al. 2003).
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of production); an increasing regulatory burden; and depletion of inshore
stocks, causing fishers to travel farther to fishing grounds. 
By contrast, nonmotorized fisheries, fisheries that use passive gears (such as
traps) and thus relatively less fuel, and fisheries that have ready access to export
markets may have seen an improvement in profitability in this period. Tech-
nology also has driven productivity gains. Using sophisticated fish-finding
equipment, tuna purse seiners in the western Indian Ocean can now harvest
three times the annual catch of seiners operating in the mid-1980s. New
designs of trawls reduce the required engine power and fuel consumption by a
factor of 33 percent or more (Richard and Tait 1997). Electronic sale of fish
while vessels are still at sea reduces transaction costs, helps prevent loss of
product quality and value, and makes markets more efficient (Jensen 2007).
However, as these innovations are adopted and spread throughout a fleet,
aggregate productivity falls, and the economic rents generated through the
increasing productivity are not maintained. 
Fuel consumption varies considerably, depending not only on different fish-
ing methods and types of fisheries but also on the fuel efficiency of engines. At
the global level, on average each ton of fish landed required nearly half a ton of
fuel. In value terms, production of a ton of fish worth $918 required $282 worth
of fuel, or 31 percent of the output value, in 2004. The impact of the recent
(2007–08) doubling of fuel prices is briefly addressed in a subsequent section and
the overall trend in fish, food, and fuel prices is illustrated in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4  Trends in Fish, Food, and Fuel Prices
Source: FAO FishStat Plus; FAO FIEP; U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration. The imputed fish price index for 2006 and 2007 was derived from a corre-
lation with the FAO Food Price Index.
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Figure 2.5  Global Population Growth and Trend of Total Number of
Capture Fishers 
Source: FAO 1999 (1970, 1990 data); FAO 2007c (1990, 2000 data); FAO FIES. 
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2.2.2  Trends in Employment, Labor Productivity, 
and Fishing Incomes
During the past three decades, the number of fishers and fish farmers has grown
at a higher rate than the world’s population growth rate (figure 2.5). Catching
and fish-farming activities provided livelihoods to an estimated 41 million peo-
ple in 2004 employed as either part-time or full-time fishworkers.3 Applying an
assumed ratio of 1:3 for direct employment (production) and secondary activities
(postharvest processing, marketing, distribution), respectively (FAO 2007b),
about 123 million people are estimated to be involved in postharvest processing,
distribution, and marketing activities. Many countries do not separate capture
fisheries and aquaculture employment data. Based on available fisheries labor sta-
tistics, the number of capture fishers account for three-quarters of employment in
fisheries globally.
Although employment in capture fisheries has been growing steadily in most
low- and middle-income countries, fisheries employment in most industrial
economies has been declining. This decline can be attributed to several factors,
including the relatively low remuneration in relation to often high-risk and dif-
ficult working conditions, growing investment in labor-saving onboard equip-
ment (FAO 2007c), and a failure to attract younger workers. The increase in
numbers of fishworkers in developing countries is not only a result of increased
fish production activities. For some communities, fisheries is a growing poverty
trap and, in the absence of alternatives, a livelihood of last resort. 
Asia has by far the highest share and growth rate in the numbers of fishers and
fish farmers (figure 2.6). In this region, the number of fishers increased threefold
over the three decades from 1970 to 2000—reflecting both a strong increase in
part-time and occasional employment in capture fisheries and the growth in
aquaculture activities. In Africa, growth was more moderate until 1990 but has
accelerated sharply since then. 
An indicator of labor productivity is the output per person measured either
in physical or value terms. Figure 2.7 shows the average output per fisher val-
ued at average ex-vessel prices in 1998–2000. Average output per fisher ranged
from a high of just above $19,000 in Europe to about $2,231 in Africa and
$1,720 in Asia, about a 10-fold difference. 
The low labor productivity in Africa and Asia reflects low fishing incomes
in most countries in these regions. For example, the estimated average gross
revenue per full-time fisher in India’s marine fisheries was $3,400 in 2004.
Small-scale fishers grossed an average of $1,870, and the figure for fishers on
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Figure 2.6  Total Number of Capture Fishers by Region 
Source: FAO 1999 (1970, 1990 data); FAO 2007c (1990, 2000, 2004 data).
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Fi
sh
er
s 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
Fi
sh
er
s 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
2.5
3.0
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
1970 1980 1990 2000
1970 1980 1990 2000
Europe
North and Central America
South America
Oceania 
Africa
Asia
Rest of the world
Total 
THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF WORLD MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 17
Figure 2.7  Gross Revenue per Marine and Inland Capture Fisher 
(average 1998–2000 in US$)
Source: FAO 2002, 2007c; FAO FishStat Plus.
Note: Data for South America have been adjusted to take low-value fish used for reduction
(fishmeal) into account.
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industrial vessels was $5,490 (Kurien 2007). Average labor productivity is
higher when only full-time fishers are considered, but labor productivity is still
significantly below labor productivity values in other primary sectors of these
economies. 
There is both hard and anecdotal evidence of low levels of crew remuner-
ations in many of the world’s marine fisheries. For example, Vietnamese
workers on fishing vessels operating in African waters and flagged in coun-
tries with per capita income some 10 times higher than in Vietnam receive a
monthly pay of $150–180 and working conditions include 16- to 18-hour
work days.4 A significant share of crews on Thai industrial fishing vessels are
from Myanmar and Cambodia, two countries with widespread poverty and
average incomes some eight times lower than those of Thailand. Based on
average country poverty data, some 5.8 million, or 20 percent, of the world’s
29 million fishers, may be small-scale fishers that earn less than $1 a day
(FAO 2004).
The strong growth in capture fisheries employment (that is, fishers operating
full time, part time, occasionally, or with unspecified status) has not resulted in
a commensurate increase in inland and marine capture fisheries production. As
shown in figure 2.8, the average reported harvest per capture fisher has declined
by 42 percent, from more than 5 tons annually in 1970 to only 3.1 tons in 2000. 
The significance of this decline in average output per fisher has to be seen
in the context of the enormous technological developments that have taken
place in the world’s capture fisheries during this period, including large-scale
motorization of traditional small-scale fisheries, the expansion of active fish-
ing techniques such as trawling and purse seining, the introduction of
increasingly sophisticated fish-finding and navigation equipment, and the
growing use of modern means of communication. Although this technologi-
cal progress has certainly increased labor productivity in many fisheries, at the
aggregate global level the resource constraint in combination with widespread
open access conditions have prevented an increase in average labor produc-
tivity in the world’s capture fisheries. Overall, productivity has significantly
declined, a decline caused by a shrinking resource base and a growing num-
ber of fishers.
Because the number of fishing vessels has also increased significantly over the
last several decades (see below), at the global level the productivity-enhancing
investments in capture fisheries have on average yielded poor returns and have
stymied growth in labor productivity and incomes in the sector. 
2.3  FISHING EFFORT AND FISHING FLEETS
Fishing effort is a composite indicator of fishing activity. It includes the num-
ber, type, and power of fishing vessels and the type and amount of fishing gear.
It captures the contribution of navigation and fish-finding equipment, as well
as the skill of the skipper and fishing crew. Effective effort is difficult to quan-
tify even in a single fishery, and there is considerable uncertainty about the cur-
rent level of global fishing effort. Given the multiple dimensions of fishing
effort, it is understandable why no global statistics are available. 
The primary factor influencing fishing effort is the size of the global fishing
fleet, characterized in terms of vessel numbers, tonnage, and engine power, and
type of fishing gear as described in the following section. 
In biological terms, fishing effort equates with fishing mortality. The func-
tional relationship is determined by a factor known as the “catchability coeffi-
cient.” This coefficient is a measure of both the level of harvesting technology
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Figure 2.8  Annual Catch (Marine and Inland) per Capture Fisher, 1970–2000 
Source: FAO FishStat Plus; FAO 2002; FAO 2007c; FAO FIES.
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and fishing skill as well as the relative ease of harvesting the fish stock in terms
of its distribution and abundance. This variable is captured in the bioeconomic
model by the schooling parameter discussed in chapter three.
2.3.1  Development in the Global Fishing Fleet
The reported global fleet has increased numerically by about 75 percent over
the past 30 years to a total of approximately 4 million decked and undecked
units in 2004 (FAO 2007c; figure 2.9 ). The number of decked (motorized) ves-
sels more than doubled in this period, and the average age of the global fleet of
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Figure 2.9  Total Number of Decked and Undecked Fishing Vessels Per
Region, 1970–98
Source: FAO FIES; FAO 1999.
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Figure 2.10  Estimated Number of New Fishing Vessels Built and Total
Registered Fleet Size (Vessels over 100 GT/GRT)
Source: Based on Lloyd's data for vessels 100 gross tons or more and reproduced with per-
mission; S. Garcia and The Royal Society (Garcia and Grainger 2005, fig. 11, p. 29).
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large fishing vessels has continued to increase. Asia accounts by far for the
highest number of vessels, both decked and undecked. 
FAO data on national fishing fleets are primarily derived from administra-
tive records, which may not always be current. For example, national records
may include fishing vessels that are not currently operational and they fre-
quently omit large numbers of unregistered small-scale fishing vessels (FAO
2007c). A further difficulty in maintaining a consistent data set results from
the progressive change in the measurement of vessel size from gross registered
tonnage to gross tonnage and the reflagging of vessels to flags of convenience. 
For large vessels, the Lloyd’s database (http://www.lrfairplay.com/) of ves-
sels provides a relatively robust global data set for fishing vessels above 100
gross tons. However, coverage is incomplete. Although FAO fleet statistics
show an increase in global fleet size since the early 1990s, the Lloyd’s register
shows a decline in recent years in the number of fishing vessels larger than 100
gross tons (figure 2.10). This divergence in trends can be explained partly by
the evolution of the Chinese fleet, which is incompletely listed in the Lloyd’s
Register because it is domestically insured. The FAO statistics used for this
fleet and for smaller vessels have been compiled from national statistics. In
2002, China adopted a five-year program to reduce its commercial fleet by
30,000 vessels (7 percent) by 2007. However, the numbers of commercial fish-
ing vessels reported to FAO in both 2003 and 2004 are above the number
reported as being in operation in 2002 (FAO 2007c). 
2.3.2  Development in Fishing Capacity and Fleet 
Productivity
Fishing capacity is the amount of fishing effort that can be produced in a
given time by a fishing vessel or fleet under full utilization for a given fishery
resource condition (FAO 2000). Both the increase in vessel numbers and in
vessel technology have enhanced the capacity of the global fleet and facilitated
access to an expanding range of marine fishery resources and more efficient
use of these resources.
Fitzpatrick (1996) estimated that the technological coefficient, a parameter
of vessel capacity, grew at a rate of 4.3 percent per year.5 Assuming that this
trend has continued, growth in technological efficiency coupled with growth in
the number of vessels suggests a steeply rising global fleet capacity. The capac-
ity index shown in figure 2.11 is a multiple of the total number of decked ves-
sels and the technological coefficient.6 The trend line of the catch/capacity
index demonstrates that the global harvesting productivity has on average
declined by a factor of six. 
The exploitation of a growing number of less productive fish stocks partly
explains this decline in harvesting productivity, but the buildup of fishing
overcapacity is clearly a major contributing factor. Thus, the gains from tech-
nological progress have generally not been realized because the limited fish
stocks require a concomitant reduction in the number of vessels to allow for
improved vessel productivity. 
The decline in physical productivity is compounded by the decreasing
spread between average harvesting costs and average ex-vessel fish prices,
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Figure 2.11  Evolution of Global Fleet Productivity (Decked Vessels) 
Source: Authors’ calculations; Garcia and Newton (1997); FAO FishStat Plus; FAO FIEP.
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 causing depressed profit margins and reinvestment. Although this has a damp-
ening effect on growth in fleet capacity, depressed fleet reinvestment may
retard a shift to more energy-efficient harvesting technologies and a reduction
in the carbon footprint of the fishing industry. 
Many countries have adopted policies to limit the growth of national fish-
ing capacity, both to protect the aquatic resources and to make fishing more
economically viable for the harvesting enterprises (FAO 2007c). These policies
have proven difficult and costly to implement in many instances, and even
when numbers of vessels have been successfully reduced (Curtis and Squires
2007), the reduction in fishing effort has been considerably less than propor-
tional, because it is the less efficient vessels that tend to exit the fishery, and
expansion in technical efficiency counters the reduction in vessel numbers. 
The global fleet has attempted to maintain its profitability in several ways:
by reducing real labor costs, by fleet modernization, and by introduction of
fuel-efficient technologies and practices, particularly in developed countries.
Vessels are also reported to remain in harbor for increasingly longer periods of
the year, focusing harvesting on peak fishing seasons. 
The receipt of government financial support has also assisted both vessel
operators and crews, for instance, through income compensation for crews.
Subsidies in the world’s marine fisheries have received growing attention in
recent years and are further discussed later. 
2.3.3  The Effects of Changing Fuel and Food Prices
The impact of higher fuel and food prices on marine capture fisheries is
becoming clearer. The effect depends on the interplay between the impact of
the fuel price change on the level of fishing effort; the price elasticity of
demand for fish in economies in which the cost of the entire food basket
increases; and the changes in per capita incomes that underlie the demand for
fish. The outcome of this interplay is likely to be specific to the economy of
individual fisheries and the markets for the products of that fishery (table 2.1).
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Table 2.1  The Effects of Fuel and Food Price Increases 
Fuel price increases may: Food price increases may: 
• reduce fishing effort as a result 
of higher costs
• reduce fish supply and drive fish 
prices higher
• change fishing patterns to 
less fuel-intensive modes
• result in higher fuel subsidies
• increase fish prices to more than
compensate for higher harvest costs
• redirect forage fisheries (fish meal) catches
to higher-value human food products 
• allow aquaculture products to permanently
capture market share from marine capture
fishery products
• stimulate increased fishing effort
Source: Authors.
A number of fuel-intensive fleets ceased to operate in mid-2008; others are
benefiting from subsidized fuel to stay operational. The past trend to replace
labor with capital is likely to slow or reverse as labor-intensive fisheries become
relatively more viable. Products from less fuel-intensive aquaculture may also
capture markets. Reduced fishing effort is likely to result in recovery of some
fish stocks. Meanwhile, the economic hardship may offer an opportunity for
measures to bring fishing capacity into balance with resources.
2.4  SUBSIDIES
Many subsidies in the fisheries sector are pernicious because they foster overca-
pacity and overexploitation of fish stocks. By reducing the cost of harvesting, for
example, through fuel subsidies or grants for new fishing vessels, subsidies
enable fishing to continue at previously uneconomic levels. Subsidies effectively
counter the economic incentive to cease fishing when it is unprofitable (box 2.1).
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There is a wide range of definitions of subsidies. The most precise is probably
that used by the World Trade Organization (Article 1 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures), which can be summarized as follows:
a financial contribution by the public sector that provides private benefits to
the fisheries sector. The contribution can be direct or indirect (such as forgone
tax revenue). The contributions can be provided as goods or services, or as
income or price supports. Subsidies exclude provision of general infrastruc-
ture, or “purchases goods.”
Common fisheries sector subsidies include grants, concessional credit and
insurance, tax exemptions, fuel price support (or fuel tax exemption), direct
payments to industry, such as vessel buyback schemes, fish price support, and
public financing of fisheries access agreements. In addition, subsidies have
variously been considered to include government fisheries extension and sci-
entific research services. Policy changes, such as relaxation of environmental
regulations governing fisheries or special work permits for migrant fishwork-
ers (crew), can also reduce costs in the sector and such distortions also have
been regarded as a form of subsidy. 
The justification offered for subsidies ranges from protection of infant indus-
tries, through national food security and prevention of fish spoilage, to social
rationales such as preservation of traditional livelihoods and poverty reduction.
Fuel subsidies are an example of a transfer that reduces the cost of fishing.
The reduced costs restore profitability and create perverse incentives for con-
tinued fishing in the face of declining catches. The result is overfishing, fleet
overcapitalization, reduced economic efficiency of the sector, and resource
rent dissipation.
Source: Authors; Schrank 2003; WTO 1994.
Box 2.1  What Are Subsidies?
Several direct estimates of subsidies and financial transfers to the fisheries
sector have been made (Millazo 1998; Pricewaterhouse Coopers 2000; OECD
2000; Sumaila and Pauly 2006), and several attempts have been made to classify
fisheries subsidies in relation to their perceived impact on the sustainability of
fisheries and on international trade (for example, “traffic lights,” as proposed by
the United States to the WTO (World Trade Organization) Negotiating Group
on Rules. Recent discussions also have focused attention on both the social
rationale and potential negative impacts of subsidies to small-scale fishing
(Schorr and Caddy 2007). An updated global estimate of capacity-enhancing
subsidies for both developing and developed countries is shown in table 2.2. 
Over $10 billion in subsidies that directly impact fishing capacity and foster
rent dissipation were provided in 2000. Close to 80 percent of the total global
subsidy is provided by developed countries. Transfers of public funds and sup-
ports to the fisheries sector are directed at a spectrum of goods ranging from
the purely public to the purely private. The issue of subsidies is closely linked
to the policies and principles underlying fiscal regimes for fisheries, which
must untangle the web of weak property rights prevalent in most fisheries. The
issue of subsidies is further addressed later in the discussion. Subsidies are not
distinguished as a separate input to the bioeconomic model used to estimate
the sunken billions.
2.5  THE COSTS OF FISHERY MANAGEMENT
Both fishers and the public sector incur fisheries management costs. The costs
to the public are significant, ranging from 1 to 14 percent of the value of land-
ings for enforcement (monitoring, control, and surveillance) activities alone
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Table 2.2  Estimate of Fisheries Subsidies with Direct Impact on
Fishing Capacity per Year, 2000 ($ billion)
Subsidy types
Developing
countries
Developed
countries
Global
total
Percent of
global total
Fuel           1.3         5.08     6.4       63.5
Surplus fish purchases           0         0.03       0         0.3
Vessel construction, renewal
and modernization
          0.6         1.30     1.9       18.9
Tax exemption programs           0.4         0.34     0.7         7.3
Fishing access agreements           0         1.00     1.0         9.9
Global total           2.3         7.75   10.05 100
Source: Compiled from Milazzo 1998, with updated information from Sumaila and
Pauly 2006; Sharp and Sumaila forthcoming; and Sumaila et al. 2007.
(Kelleher 2002a) and imposing a substantial burden on international fisheries
management processes (High Seas Task Force 2006). The generation of scien-
tific advice and the process of management also represent significant costs
(Arnason, Hannesson, and Schrank 2000).
The public costs of fisheries management have not been taken into account in
the estimate of lost rents. These costs are not included in the global bioeconomic
model because representative global data are deficient and because the relation-
ship between expenditures on fisheries management and net benefit from the
fishery remains unclear. The few studies that have been made of fisheries man-
agement costs in developing countries suggest inadequately low levels of manage-
ment expenditures (Willmann, Boonchuwong, and Piumsombun 2003).
2.5.1  Costs Associated with Illegal, Unreported, 
and Unregistered Fishing
The International Plan of Action to combat illegal, unreported, and unregis-
tered (IUU) fishing (FAO 2001a) bundles these three related activities and, as
a result, studies have tended to bundle rather than disaggregate estimates of the
economic impact of these quite distinct fishing activities. Illegal and unre-
ported fishing are of particular interest for the estimate of rents. However, to
account for the economic impacts of illegal and unreported fishing, greater
knowledge on the scale of both and a greater understanding of the economics
of illegal fishing is required (Sutinen and Kuperan 1994; OECD 2006; Sumaila,
Alder, and Keith 2006; MRAG and UBC 2008).
The estimates of unreported fishing, or more specifically of underreported
or misreported catches, are of considerable interest for the purposes of assess-
ment of economic benefits from fishing. By definition, such estimates are not
reflected in FAO’s FishStat Plus. The estimates range from multiples of national
FishStat Plus values, for example, in the case of some countries that underre-
port catches from highly dispersed small-scale fisheries to deliberate underre-
porting of 10–20 percent or more in managed fisheries where fishers seek to
circumvent quota restrictions. However, in the absence of a robust basis for
adjusting the reported catch to the estimated real catch, the FAO FishStat Plus
values remain as the core global data set used in the global bioeconomic model. 
Illegal fishing can be considered as additional effort that takes place at a
lower cost than legitimate effort. However, the production from this illegal
effort may be recorded or included in the estimates of catches, or landings. For
example, the catch from use of an illegal type of net may be indistinguishable
from that of a legal net. Illicit catches affect rent generation by undermining
the governance structure of the fishery, by undermining market prices for
legitimate product, and by imposing added management enforcement costs as
indicated earlier.
Illicit catches are frequently unreported—for example, fish under a legal
size limit, or catch in excess of quota. The resulting inaccuracies in catch
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 statistics are an important source of uncertainty with respect to scientific
advice on fisheries management (Pauly et al. 2002; FAO 2002; Kelleher 2002b;
Pitcher et al. 2002; Corveler 2002), and the depletion of many stocks has been
attributed partly to the inaccuracy of the historical catch data. The parallel
markets for illicit fish set a discounted price for fish, not only directly through
illicit landings but also by avoidance of sanitary controls or rules of origin reg-
ulations, such that normally compliant fishers may be compelled to revert to
illicit practices to remain solvent. 
NOTES
1. Nominal value is the value of money in different years; real value adjusts for differ-
ences in the price level in those years.
2. Estimate provided by FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Information and Statistics
Service (FIES). All values exclude marine plants. The unit values from “FAO World
Fishery Production Estimated Value by Species Groups” were weighted by the
quantity of the respective marine catches in 2004. Discards are assumed to have
zero value.
3. Preliminary results of a new World Bank–FAO–WorldFish Center study indicate that
this may be a substantial underestimate.
4. The International Labour Organization of the United Nations recently adopted a
comprehensive new labor standard, the “Work in Fishing Convention,” which will
come into effect when ratified by 10 of the ILO’s 180 member states, of which at least
8 are coastal states. 
5. For 13 different vessel types (from pirogues of 10 meters up to super trawlers of 120
meters), the coefficient increased on average from 0.54 in 1965 to 1.98 in 1995, or by
about 366 percent in 30 years.
6. In some managed fisheries, increase in technological capacity has been limited by
gear regulations and other fishery management measures.
3.1  BACKGROUND
This study draws on previous efforts to develop an economic assessmentfor the world’s marine capture fisheries. Christy and Scott (1965) sug-gested that the growth of marine fisheries production would stagnate
and proposed that the “maximize sustained yield” objective be replaced by a
“maximize rent from the sea” objective. In 1992 (revised, 1993) FAO esti-
mated the aggregate operating deficit incurred by the world’s fishing fleets at
$54 billion in 1989, the base year of the study (see box 3.1). A study by Garcia
and Newton (1997) indicated that an economically efficient global capture
fishery required a reduction of between 25 percent and 53 percent in the global
fishing fleet. 
Because of the deficit of information on the economic health of the
world’s fisheries, the 2005 World Bank report “Where Is the Wealth of
Nations?” was unable to take specific account of fisheries. To address this
deficit in the knowledge of the global fishery economy, a workshop was held
under the auspices of the World Bank’s PROFISH Program (Kelleher and
Willmann 2006). The workshop also recognized the need to highlight the
current level of global economic rents loss and to raise awareness on economic
objectives of fisheries management. 
The workshop identified two alternative approaches to the task. One
approach is to estimate the rents and rents loss in each of the world’s fisheries
or a representative sample of them. This is a major undertaking. 
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Estimate of Net Economic
Loss in the Global Marine
Fishery
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
An alternative, simpler approach is to regard the global ocean fishery as one
aggregate fishery. This approach has several advantages. The data requirements
are immensely reduced. Many of these global fisheries data are readily avail-
able, and the model manipulation and calculations are a fraction of that
required for a study of a high number of individual fisheries. The aggregate
approach, regarding the global fisheries as a single fishery is considered the
only way to quickly and inexpensively obtain reasonable estimates of the global
fisheries rents loss in a transparent and replicable manner. 
On this basis, the workshop recommended that two independent
approaches to the estimation of the loss of economic rents in global marine
fisheries be prepared. Each estimate would serve as a cross-check on the other:
■ The first study would estimate the global rent drain (or potential loss of net
benefits) through an aggregate model of the global fishery. This report doc-
uments the results of this first approach.
■ The second, companion study would undertake a set of case studies on
economic rents in a representative set of fisheries and endeavor to extrap-
olate results and lessons of case studies to the global level. This work is still
in progress.
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Box 3.1  The Framework of Prior Studies
The 1992 FAO study “Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea—a Decade of
Change” (revised, 1993) estimated the aggregate operating deficit incurred
by the world’s fishing fleets at $22 billion for the base year of the study
(1989). If the cost of capital cost is added, aggregated deficit was estimated
at $54 billion per year, or nearly three-fourths of the estimated gross revenue
of $70 billion from the global marine fish harvest. The primary causes of
these deficits were attributed to the open access management regime that
governed most of the world fisheries and rampant subsidization of the
global fishing fleet.
Building on the FAO study, Garcia and Newton (1997) examined the
trends and future perspective of world fisheries. The authors confirmed the
broad conclusions of the 1992 FAO study, the large overcapacity of the global
fishing fleet, and the need to reform fishery management systems if long-
term economic and environmental sustainability of the world fishery system
was to be achieved. They concluded that even though the world’s oceans
seemed to be exploited at maximum sustainable yield levels, an economically
efficient global capture fishery would require either a 43 percent reduction
in global fishing costs, or a 71 percent global price increase of capture fish-
ery products, or a global capture fleet capacity reduction between 25 percent
and 53 percent.
The study reported here is based on a simple aggregative model for the
global fishery. It improves on the previous FAO studies mentioned above in
at least three important ways. First, the concept of fisheries rents and rents
loss is made explicit. Second, the theoretical assumptions, the assumptions
based on empirical data, and the way the conclusions are derived are clearly
and systematically specified. This allows testing, improvement, and updat-
ing. Third, the study systematically accounts for a level of uncertainty in the
estimated values and assumptions. This is done in two ways: first, a standard
sensitivity analysis of the calculated rents loss to the basic input data for the
global aggregated fishery model provides upper and lower bounds on the
rent loss estimates. Second, reasonable probability distributions for the basic
input data for the model are assumed and the resulting probability distribu-
tion of the calculated rents loss derived. On this basis, statistical confidence
intervals are produced for the rent loss estimate using stochastic (Monte
Carlo) simulations.
3.2  USE OF THE TERMS NET BENEFITS
AND ECONOMIC RENTS
Economists traditionally use economic rents as a measure of the net economic
benefits attributable to a natural resource. Rents are not equal to profits—the
difference is fixed costs and so-called intramarginal profits. However, rents and
profits are usually similar and may sometimes be identical. The economic per-
formance of the global marine fisheries may be measured as the difference
between maximum rents obtainable from the fisheries and the actual rents
 currently obtained. 
This estimate of the loss of fisheries rents in global marine capture fisheries
focuses on the harvesting sector, that is, the fishery up to the point of first sale.
An economically efficient fishery up to the point of first sale will also drive
additional downstream efficiencies, for example, in fish processing. This is
because, to be efficient, the harvesting sector will adjust the quantity, quality,
and timing of landings to the demand from downstream sectors. Estimates of
rents from such potential downstream efficiency gains are not captured in the
model presented here but are briefly addressed in the subsequent discussion. 
In this study, the terms net benefits, economic rents, and rents are equivalent,
and these terms are used interchangeably in the text. In the pure economic
sense, however, they are not equivalent. Box 3.2 and appendix 1 describe these
concepts in more technical detail. 
As already mentioned, this study estimates this loss of potential economic
benefits, or rent dissipation, at an aggregate global level. The global level of rent
dissipation is an excellent (inverse) metric of the economic and biological health
of the global fishery. The economic objective is to maximize the net economic
benefits (sustainable rents) flowing from the fishery. For the great majority of
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Box 3.2  Net Benefits, Economic Rents, and Overfishing
The resource rent is a measure of the net economic benefits from the harvest
of wild fish stocks. Different fisheries generate different levels of resource
rent. For example, a fishery for a high-value species in coastal waters (which
has a low cost of harvesting) will generate more rent (or profits to fishers)
than a fishery for a low-value species harvested at high cost in deep water. As
more fishers join a profitable fishery, they add to the aggregate costs of catch-
ing the limited quantity of fish available. As a result, the aggregate net bene-
fit, or economic rent, decreases, becoming dissipated among the fishers in the
form of higher costs and lower returns for their fishing operations or fishing
effort. The rents may even become negative when public financial transfers or
subsidies are provided to support an economically unhealthy fishery. As more
fishers make greater efforts (for example, by fishing longer hours or investing
in more fishing gear) to maintain their previous profits or catch levels, the
fishers tend to deplete the fish stock capital that sustains the productivity of
the fishery. This further reduces the potential net benefits.
As soon as the level of fishing effort moves above the point of maximum
economic yield, a situation of economic overfishing exists. Such economic
overfishing can exist even if the fish stock itself remains healthy or biologically
sustainable. This is illustrated in the box figure.
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) and Maximum Economic Yield (MEY)
Economists traditionally measure the net economic benefits from a natural
resource such as a fish stock by economic rents. Rents are not equal to profits
but are usually similar, and may sometimes be identical, to profits. Thus, the
inefficiency of fisheries may be measured as the difference between maximum
rents obtainable from the fisheries and the actual rents currently obtained. 
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commercial fish stocks, this implies a biomass level in excess of the one pro-
ducing the maximum sustainable yield. Even in fisheries with quite high dis-
count rates and comparatively low biomass growth rates, the biomass level at
which the economic rents are maximized almost always exceeds the biomass
level that can provide the maximum sustainable physical yield (Grafton,
Kompass, and Hilborn 2007). Thus, as a general rule, economically healthy
fisheries require biologically healthy fish stocks, while biologically healthy fish
stocks do not necessarily mean economically healthy fisheries. 
3.3  DESCRIPTION OF THE AGGREGATE MODEL
Based on Arnason 2007, an aggregate model of the global fisheries is specified
to estimate rents loss for the global marine fishery. This model and procedure
for fitting the model are detailed in appendix 2. The model entails several gross
abstractions from the real world. In particular, the model assumes that global
fisheries can be modeled as a single fish stock with an aggregate biomass
growth function. Similarly, the global fishing industry is represented by an
aggregate fisheries profit function, composed of an aggregate harvesting func-
tion, relating the harvest to fishing effort and biomass, and an aggregate cost
function relating fishing effort to fisheries costs. 
Fisheries and the rents they generate are dynamic and rarely in equilib-
rium, implying several approaches for calculating rents losses. This study
compares maximum sustainable rents to the actual rents in the base year
(2004). The difference is taken to represent the rents loss in the base year. In
this study, sustainable (or long-run) rents are identical to profits, so that max-
imum sustainable rents (MSR) are obtained at the fishing effort level corre-
sponding to the maximum economic yield (MEY) (see figure in box 3.1). The
rents loss estimate assumes that the existing biological overfishing is entirely
reversible in the long run. Finally, the estimate does not take account of the
costs of restoring the global fishery to economic health.
Treating the diverse global fisheries as a single aggregate fishery allows for a
model with a manageable number of parameters. A set of available observa-
tions on the global fisheries is used to estimate the parameters. 
The model’s simplifications and uncertainty with respect to global fisheries
parameters are partially offset by sensitivity analysis of the results and sto-
chastic simulations to establish reasonable upper and lower bounds and con-
fidence limits for the global fisheries rents loss. It is anticipated that the model
will be further tuned and cross-checked using a series of case studies currently
in preparation. 
3.3.1  Schaefer and Fox Models
The population dynamics of the exploitable aggregate biomass (the global fish-
ery) are modeled through a logistic, or Schaefer-type, model and through a Fox
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model. The main difference between these two biomass growth functions is that
the Fox model assumes that, all else being equal, the biomass is much more
resilient to increasing fishing effort, in other words, the sustainable biomass and
harvest will decline more slowly as fishing effort increases (figure 3.1). The Fox
model is consistent with the experience from the global fishery that even
though many of the most valuable demersal fish stocks have become depleted,
the aggregate global harvest has continued to increase and has not contracted
significantly despite ever-increasing fishing effort. 
These models were selected because they are in widespread use for fisheries
assessment. Two models are used to reflect the uncertainty with regard to the
shape of the biomass growth function of the global aggregate fishery, which may
not necessarily equate to a simple sum of individual fishery functions. Other
types of aggregate biomass growth functions exist of course. Many of them,
however, fall within the range defined by the logistic and the Fox functions.
The shape of the yield-effort curve is given principally by the carrying
capacity, or pristine state, of the fish stock(s), the maximum sustainable
yield, and the parameters of the harvesting (catch production) function. Of
these parameters, estimates of the maximum sustainable yield are more
robust than estimates of the other two parameters because comprehensive
global marine fish catch statistics are available for over 50 years and harvest
trends have been relatively stable for nearly two decades in the range of
79–88 million tons. 
3.4  MODEL PARAMETERS AND DATA
As noted earlier, this study assumes that global fisheries can be modeled as a
single fish stock. Recovery of lost rent also assumes that biological overfishing
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Figure 3.1  Comparative Yield-effort Curves Corresponding to the Logistic
(Schaefer) and Fox Biomass Growth Functions 
Source: Authors’ depiction.
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is reversible. The basic data used to estimate model parameters and parameter
assumptions are listed in table 3.1. The sources for the data and justification for
assumptions are provided in the following sections. Further details and the
theoretical relationships are further explained in appendix 2. The year 2004 is
taken as the base year for the model because several robust data sets are avail-
able for that period. However, adjusted data from other years, or a series of
years, is used where data for 2004 are deficient.
3.4.1  Global Maximum Sustainable Yield and Carrying Capacity
The global MSY is assumed to be higher than the reported marine catch in
the base year (85.7 million tons, FAO FishStat Plus) plus estimated discards 
(7.3 million tons), which gives a total of 93 million tons. A conservative value of
95 million tons is used in the model. Though higher than the catch in the base
year, this value is lower than the sum of the maximum reported catch for each
species group in the past (101 million tons) (FAO FishStat Plus). It is also in the
same range as that suggested by Gulland in 1971 (100 million tons) and lower
than a maximum of 115 million tons suggested by Christy and Scott (1965).
This estimate of the global MSY refers to conventional fisheries only. For
example, Antarctic krill is the subject of increasing attention as new harvesting
technologies develop and markets for Omega 3 fish oils expand. A major
expansion of this fishery could substantially raise the global MSY. 
Since the 1990s, reported marine catches have fluctuated between 79 million
and 86 million tons without an apparent trend. Given the estimate of the MSY,
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Table 3.1  Model Empirical Inputs and Estimated Parameters
Model inputs
Model 
input values
Units of
measurement
Biological 
Maximum sustainable yield 95 Millions of tons
Global biomass carrying capacity 453 Millions of tons
Biomass growth in 2004 –2 Millions of tons
Fishing industry
Landings in 2004 85.7 Millions of tons
Value of landings in 2004 78.8 $ billions
Fisheries profits in 2004 –5 $ billions
Other parameters
Schooling parameter 0.70 No units
Fixed cost ratio in 2004 0 No units
Elasticity of demand with respect 
to biomass
0.2 No units
Source: See following sections.
this suggests that the current global fishery is now located to the right of the
MSY (see figure in box 2.2). This means that current global fish stocks are
smaller than those corresponding to the MSY, in accordance with the general
belief that the global fishery is biologically overfished. 
The carrying capacity corresponding to the equilibrium MEY is assessed
as 453 million tons. This is based on the average relationship between the
known carrying capacity and the MSY for a number of fisheries (see table A4.2
in appendix 4). 
3.4.2  Biomass Growth in the Base Year
The stability of the aggregate reported catch over the recent past is consistent
with a relatively constant aggregate global biomass. During this period, some
stocks (for example, demersal stocks such as cod and hake in parts of the
Atlantic) have declined markedly in response to fishing pressure, climatic fac-
tors, and other influences. Other stocks, such as some pelagic stocks in the
North Atlantic, have increased while other large stocks have remained largely
unchanged (FAO 2005). Overall, it appears unlikely that in the base year, 2004,
there was a significant net increase or decline in global stocks of commercial
marine species. However, because global reported catches in 2004 were close to
the upper boundary of annual global catches since the 1990s and reported
catches in 2005 were lower, it is conservatively assumed, that in 2004 global
marine commercial biomass growth was negative, or –2 million tons. 
3.4.3  Volume of Landings in the Base Year and Reported 
and Real Marine Fisheries Catches
In accordance with official FAO statistics (FAO FishStat Plus), the global catch in
the base year is taken to be 85.7 tons. Acknowledging the deficiencies of the FAO
FishStat Plus records, the FAO has repeatedly called for more comprehensive and
accurate reporting of fish catches (FAO 2001a). The level of acknowledged mis-
and underreporting of catch has been addressed with varying degrees of success
by different authors. The reasons for misreporting vary widely from deliberate
underreporting of quota species and deficiencies in transmission of information
to FAO, to widespread underestimates of small-scale fisheries  production, and to
reported overestimates of fish production in the case of China and possibly in
other countries. The estimated level of underreporting varies widely. The esti-
mates of underreporting range from 1.2 to 1.8 times the catch (as reported to
FAO) in reportedly well-managed fisheries to several times the reported catch in
countries with extensive and isolated small-scale fisheries or with high levels of
illegal fishing (Oceanic Développement 2001; Kelleher 2002b; MRAG and UBC
2008; Zeller and Pauly 2007; Pauly 1995; Watson and Pauly 2001). However, in
the absence of a robust basis for adjusting the reported catch to the estimated real
catch, the FAO FishStat Plus values remain as the core data set for this study. 
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3.4.4  Value of Landings in the Base Year
The value of landings in 2004 is discussed extensively in chapter 2. Based on
published production value data and other information, it is estimated that
this value was $78.8 billion (FAO 2007c), which corresponds to an average
landed price of $0.918 per kilogram. 
3.4.5  Harvesting Costs
As indicated in chapter 2, the estimate of harvesting costs must be treated with
due caution because of the weak and incomplete data on the world’s fishing
fleets. The data sets used include:
■ A robust set of fleet and productivity data for 21 major fishing nations that
contribute about 40 percent to global marine capture production (see table
A4.1 in appendix 4).1 These data are biased toward industrial fisheries but
are considered to be representative of all industrial fisheries.
■ Sample cost and earnings data for the European fleets (EU 25). The data
refer to the fleets of 20 countries that contributed 6.8 percent to the global
fish harvest in 2004 (Salz 2006; Concerted Action 2004).
■ A recent set of cost and earnings data for India’s industrial and small-scale
fisheries (Kurien 2007). These fisheries contribute about 2.5 percent to
global marine fish harvest. This data set has been taken to represent tropi-
cal developing countries’ fisheries.
Cost of fuel
Fuel consumption and costs are estimated on the basis of the vessel and engine
horsepower data of the fleets listed in table A4.1 in appendix 4. It is assumed
that the average vessel activity is 2,000 hours per year and the average world
market price of diesel fuel is $548 per ton.2 Fuel consumption and costs are
raised to the global level on a pro rata basis of the contribution of these fleets to
global catches. The result is an estimated annual global fuel consumption of 41
million tons valued at $22.5 billion.3 This decrease in the fuel consumption of
the global fishing fleet, compared with the previous estimate (46.7 million tons
valued at $14 billion in 1989 prices [FAO 1993]), results from a relatively con-
stant number of fishing vessels above 100 gross tons in the Lloyd’s database and
from a reduction in overall tonnage from about 15 million gross tons in 1992 to
12.6 million gross tons in 2004. Fuel efficiency has also improved in some fleets
and closed seasons may have reduced fishing time.
Cost of labor
The 1993 FAO study based its labor cost estimate on a total number of
employed crew of 12.98 million and an average annual crew income of $1,749,
leading to an estimated total labor cost of $22.7 billion. The growth in the num-
bers of fishers, including part-time and occasional fishers, since 1992 suggests
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that total labor cost of the global fishing fleet has increased. However, labor
productivity in terms of catch per fisher and catch value per fisher has
decreased. Working hours have increased and safety at sea has deteriorated
(ILO 2000), making fishing the profession with the highest labor mortality
rate. However, the deterioration in working conditions is not necessarily
reflected in labor costs. It is concluded that real per capita crew remuneration
has declined and that global labor cost has remained at a relatively constant
nominal level of $22.7 billion per year. 
Costs of other factors of production
Total operating costs (average 2002–04) exclusive of fuel and labor costs of the
fleets from 20 EU countries amounted to $292,000 per 1,000 kilowatt engine
power (Salz 2006).4 Applying this value to the fleets of the 21 fishing nations
listed in table A4.1 gives annual operating costs of $13.97 billion (exclusive of
fuel and labor). These fleets contribute about 40 percent to world harvest,
which would make the estimated global total $34.9 billion. However, these
operating costs are lower in small-scale fisheries in developing countries. In
India, for example, the operating costs (excluding fuel and labor) in small-
scale marine fisheries are on average $90 per ton of fish landed (Kurien 2007).
Assuming that small-scale fisheries contribute about 25 percent5 to the global
marine catch and that the cost structure of the remaining 75 percent of fish-
eries is accurately represented by the 21 fleets referenced above, the global
estimate for these other operating costs is $28.1 billion. 
This estimate is consistent with the comprehensive costs and earnings data
compiled for the European fleet (Salz 2006). However, it is substantially lower
than the cost of comparable items indicated in the FAO (1993) study (a total
of $55.9 billion—maintenance and repair, $30.2 billion; supplies and gear,
$18.5 billion; and insurance, $7.2 billion). The FAO estimates are higher largely
because they are based on percentages of the vessel replacement costs and on
vessels normally insured and subject to regular surveys. Many fishing vessels do
not fall in this category, especially small-scale fishing vessels both in developed
and in developing countries. 
Cost of capital
The estimate is based on the comprehensive costs and earnings data set avail-
able for the European fishing fleet. A capital value per unit of vessel power
(kilowatt) was applied to the fleets of 21 fishing nations in the European Union
(see table A4.1 in appendix 4). This value was then raised to the global total by
dividing by the ratio of the contribution of these fleets to the world marine fish
harvest, resulting in a value of $127 billion for total fleet investment.6
Total capital costs were conservatively calculated at 8.3 percent of the capi-
tal value of the fleet. This resulted in total capital costs of $10.5 billion. Depre-
ciation of this capital was conservatively calculated at 4.3 percent per year,
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resulting in global fishing fleet depreciation of $5.4 billion. Interest costs were
calculated at 4 percent, which is an estimate based on secure long-term U.S.
dollar investments such as 30-year U.S. treasury bonds. Total estimated capital
costs are summarized in table 3.2. For comparison purposes, total capital costs
according to the FAO 1993 study are also listed. 
The estimate for the total capital invested in the fleet given in the 1993 FAO
is higher than the current estimate because it was based on the estimated
replacement value (FAO 1993). However, this value ($319 million) is considered
an overestimate because the method was applied in the absence of knowledge of
the age structure of the fleet and the market prices of vessels at the time.
3.4.6  Profitability
The world’s fishing fleet is estimated to have had an operating profit of $5.5 billion
in 2004. However, the fleet incurred a capital cost estimated at $10.5 billion, which
puts the global fisheries profitability into negative territory, with an estimated
deficit of $5 billion in 2004, the base year (table 3.3). These estimates are net of
financial subsidies; that is, subsidies have already been subtracted.
It should be noted that profit estimates for the global fishing fleet suffer
from a scarcity of reliable fleet cost and earnings data. Many countries do not
systematically collect fisheries cost and earnings or profitability data, and these
data are particularly deficient for small-scale, artisanal, and subsistence fishing.
Even when such data are collected, fishers are often reluctant to provide com-
plete and accurate information, and available information is often distorted by
subsidies or taxes. Although based on limited samples, there are nevertheless
indications that substantial numbers of fisheries are unprofitable or experience
declining profitability (Lery, Prado, and Tietze 1999; Tietze et al. 2001; Tietze
et al. 2005; Watson and Seidel 2003; Hoshino and Matsuda 2007).
Fishing that operates at a real economic loss is unlikely to continue without
subsidies or forms of vertical integration that capture downstream value. This
further narrows the possible range of values for global fleet and fishing profits.
Table 3.2  Estimated Capital Cost of Global Fishing Fleet (US$ billion)
Category
1993 
FAO study
Current 
estimate
Total fleet investment                 319.0             127.0
Depreciation cost                 —                 5.4
Interest cost                 —                 5.1
Total cost of capital                 31.9               10.5
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: — Data are not available.
In addition, the “tragedy of the commons” suggests that where forms of open
access persist (which is the case in many of the world’s fisheries), profits will be
dissipated. The value of landings and costs of many factors of production are
often known. This again narrows the range for the estimate of profits. 
3.4.7  Schooling Parameter
Harvests of species with a strong tendency to congregate in relatively dense
schools or shoals (such as herrings, anchovies, and sardines) are often little
influenced by the overall biomass of the stock (Hannesson 1993). The opposite
is true for species that are relatively uniformly distributed over the fishing
grounds (such as cod or sharks). For these species, harvests tend to vary pro-
portionately with the available biomass for any given level of fishing effort.
The schooling parameter reflects these features of fisheries and normally
has a value between zero and unity. The lower the schooling parameter, the
more pronounced the schooling behavior and the less dependent the harvest is
on biomass. For many commercial species (for instance, many bottom-
dwelling, or demersal, species and shellfish), the parameter would be close to
unity (Arnason 1984). For pelagic species (such as tuna, herring, or sardine), it
is often much lower (Bjorndal 1987). A schooling parameter of less than unity
leads to a discontinuity in sustainable yield and revenue functions. These dis-
continuities are of concern because they correspond to a fisheries collapse if
fishing effort is maintained above that level for some time. 
In the harvesting function for the global fishery, the aggregate schooling
parameter should reflect the schooling behavior of the different fisheries.
An average of schooling parameters by fishery groups weighted by their
 maximum sustainable yield levels gives an aggregate schooling parameter
of approximately 0.7, which is the value used in this study (see table A4.3
in appendix 4). 
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Table 3.3  Global Fleet Estimated Profits, Current and Previous
Studies
Category 1993 FAO study Current estimate
Value of catch               70               78.8
Fuel costs               14               22.5
Labor costs               22.7               22.7
Other operating costs               55.9               28.1
Operating profit or loss             –22.6                 5.5
Total cost of capital               31.9               10.5
Global fleet profitability (deficit)             –54.4               –5.0
Source: Author’s calculations; FAO 1993 (base year 1989).
3.4.8  Elasticity of Demand with Respect to Biomass
In the global fisheries model employed in this study, the average price of land-
ings depends on the global marine commercial biomass according to a coeffi-
cient referred to as the elasticity of demand with respect to biomass. The model
uses a value of 0.2 for this parameter, which means that if the global biomass
doubles, then the average price of landing increases by 20 percent. The coeffi-
cient and the value of the coefficient are based on following rationale.
Fishing activities initially target the most valuable fish stocks and the most
profitable fisheries. These high-value species tend to be (but are not always)
those high in the marine food chain. As the fishing effort increases, the most
valuable stocks become depleted and the fishing activity targets less valuable
fish stocks (or in some cases operates in deeper waters on the continental
slopes) or targets species at lower trophic levels. This is known as “fishing
down and through the food webs.” In this situation of overfishing, the higher
proportion of lower-value species tends to depress the average price of the
aggregate catch. 
However when the reverse takes place, under a governance regime that
restores biomasses and the health of fish stocks, the average price will tend to
rise. However, this generalization must be qualified in terms of the trophic
level of the target species and efforts to achieve ecosystem balance across
related fisheries. If the target species is a high-value prey species (such as
shrimp), then rebuilding the stock of predators (in this example, lower-value
fish at a higher trophic level that eat shrimp) may in fact reduce the average
price of the aggregate landings (Hannesson 2002). Nevertheless, in general,
as stocks rebuild there will tend to be more, larger fish in the catch. Larger
fish are generally (but not always) more valuable, which results in a higher
average price for the global catch.
Under an effective fisheries management system, the unit price of landed
fish usually increases, sometimes substantially (Homans and Wilen 1997;
Homans and Wilen 2005). For example, in individual-transferable-quota-
based fisheries (one of many choices for improved fisheries management), the
average price of landings increases substantially compared with the price
before introduction of the ITQ scheme (Herrmann 1996). The reasons include
more selective fishing practices, better handling of caught fish, and better coor-
dination between demand for fish and the supply of landings. The increased
price is not necessarily related to the more valuable composition of the catch
referred to earlier. Finally, there is growing evidence that heavily fished
resources are less stable (Anderson et al. 2008), so stock recovery is likely to sta-
bilize supplies and prices and improve the efficiency of harvesting. 
3.4.8  The Fixed Cost Ratio
In this study, the loss of potential rents is estimated as the difference between
rents in the base year and maximum sustainable rents, that is, maximum rents
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where biomass (the fish stock) and the capital stock (fleet) are in equilibrium.
This equilibrium prevails when fish stocks have been rebuilt and when the fleet
has fully adjusted to sustainable catch levels. During the period of fleet adjust-
ment, or long-run economic change, the capital costs, normally regarded as
fixed costs, are actually variable. Therefore, for the purposes of comparing base
year and maximum sustainable rents, all costs are considered variable costs,
and for these theoretical reasons, the fixed cost ratio is set to zero in these cal-
culations. This does not mean that capital costs are ignored in this study but
that, for the purposes of the rents loss calculation in this study, they are
regarded as variable. 
3.4.9  Management Costs and Subsidies
As explained earlier, the costs of fisheries management are not included in the
bioeconomic model. Nor are subsidies separately identified in the cost esti-
mates. The existence of subsidies reduces the observed costs so the reported
deficit may be underestimated. These additional factors underline the conser-
vative nature of the rents loss estimate.
NOTES
1. The countries are China, EU-15, Iceland, Japan, Republic of Korea, Norway, and the
Russian Federation.
2. The impact of recent changes in fuel prices is discussed elsewhere in this report.
3. Taking as a basis data from more than 250 fisheries and spatially resolved catch
statistics for 2000, Tyedmers, Watson, and Pauly (2005) estimated global fuel con-
sumption at almost 50 billion liters, equal to 42.5 million tons. On the basis of
country-by-country fishing fleet data, Smith (in press) estimated global fuel con-
sumption at 38 million tons.
4. Averages of 2002–04 have been used and converted into US$ at an exchange rate of
1 euro = US$1.107. 
5. Because the production from small-scale fisheries tends to be underestimated, or
underreported, this value may be an underestimate. Chuenpagdee et al. 2006 sug-
gest that 25 percent may be a minimum value. Current work in progress by the FAO
and the WorldFish Center under the World Bank’s PROFISH Program (the “Big
Numbers” project) also confirm that production from small-scale fisheries may be
substantially underestimated.
6. The use of EU cost data may overestimate capital cost because of the presumed
higher capital intensity of EU fishing fleets. However, a comparison with Kurien’s
marine capture data set for India comprising primarily small-scale and semi-
industrial fishing fleets suggest that this is not the case. Capital investment per
unit of harvest show comparatively similar values: world (based on EU data)
$1,494 per ton; and India $1,240 per ton. In the case of depreciation costs, these
were estimated even higher, on average, in Indian than in EU marine fisheries.
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4.1  MAIN RESULTS
The loss of net benefits, expressed as forgone rents, is estimated to be onthe order of $50 billion in 2004, the base year. Because of model andinput data limitations, this estimate is best considered as the most
probable value of a range of possible values. Specifically, the most probable
point estimate of the global fisheries rent loss is $51 billion with an 80 percent
confidence level that the value is between $37 billion and $67 billion.
The rents loss estimate ranges between $45 and $59 billion in the base year,
depending on whether the underlying biomass growth function applied is the
Schaefer logistic or the Fox function. Table 4.1 summarizes the main results of
these calculations for the two biomass growth functions. The Fox biomass
growth function estimates a higher current fisheries rents loss primarily
because the current level of overexploitation is substantially greater when the
Fox function applies. A priori, there is no reason to choose one biomass growth
function above the other and the point estimate of $51 billion assumes an
equal probability of each function applying.
Based on the loss of net benefits in 2004, the real cumulative global loss of
wealth over the past three decades is estimated at $2.2 trillion. This estimate is
made by assuming a linear relationship between the rents and the state of the
world’s fish stocks as reported by FAO at various intervals since 1974. The esti-
mated rents loss in the base year is projected from 1974 to 2007 and raised on
the basis of the changing percentage of global fish stocks, reported by FAO as
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fully or overexploited. A conservative opportunity cost of capital of 3.5 percent
is assumed. Details of the estimate are provided in table A4.5 in appendix 4.
To maximize sustainable rents from the global fishery, the model indicates
that fishing effort should be reduced by 44 to 54 percent depending on whether
the aggregate global commercial fishery biomass growth is better described by
the logistic or the Fox biomass growth function. The models indicate that bio-
mass levels more than double in the case of the logistic and triple in the case of
the Fox biomass growth function compared with the base year estimates. In
both cases, sustainable marine fishery harvests are reduced by about 4 million
tons compared with the base year harvest. 
A summary of the results of the sensitivity analysis and the confidence
intervals for the rents loss estimate is provided in section 4.5 below.
4.2  EVIDENCE FROM GLOBAL STUDIES
Although this study is not directly comparable with previous studies, all stud-
ies (table 4.2) carry the same message: at the aggregate level, the current annual
net benefits from marine capture fisheries are tens of billions of U.S. dollars
less than the potential benefits. Society continues to be a net contributor to the
global fisheries economy through depletion of the national and global fish cap-
ital and through subsidies. 
4.3  EVIDENCE FROM CASE STUDIES
A range of case studies strongly indicates the potential for substantial increases
in rents and net benefits from fisheries. The different approaches to estimating
current and potential rents or similar indexes of net benefits preclude a syn-
thesis of all the available studies in a coherent manner as part of this study.1
However, table 4.3 and table A4.4 in appendix 4 demonstrate that potential rents
range from a significant fraction of the current fishery revenues to multiples of
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Table 4.1  Main Results—Point Estimates of Rents
Current Optimal Difference 
Category Units Logistic Fox Logistic Fox Logistic Fox
Biomass Million of tons 148.4 92.3 314.2 262.9 165.8 170.6
Harvest Million of tons 85.7 85.7 80.8 81.6 –4.9 –4.1
Effort Index 1.00 1.00 0.56 0.46 –0.44 –0.54
Profits US$ billions –5.000 –5.000 39.502 54.035 44.502 59.035
Rents US$ billions –5.000 –5.000 39.502 54.035 44.502 59.035
Source: Authors.
the current fishery revenues. Several fisheries managed in a scientific and
responsible manner may yet continue to underperform with regard to rent
generation (Kirkley et al. 2006). For example, the potential economic benefits
from rebuilding 17 overfished stocks in the United States is estimated at $567
million, or approximately three times the estimated net present value of the
fisheries without rebuilding (Sumaila and Suatoni 2006). In a followup to this
study, rents loss estimates for a representative range of fisheries will help tune
the global rents loss estimate and raise stakeholder awareness on the potential
net benefits from improved governance in specific fisheries. 
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Table 4.2  Estimates of the Economic Losses from Global Marine
Fisheries
Source Estimate of losses
Drivers / focus of
proposed solutions
FAO 1993 $54 aggregate loss, or
approximately 75 percent
of the gross revenue
Open access, subsidies
Garcia and Newton 1997 $46 billion deficit Overcapacity, loss of
high-value species
Sanchirico and Wilen
2002
$90 billion (future
projection)
Rents in ITQ fisheries
approach 60–70 percent
of gross revenues.
Wilen 2005 $80 billion Secure tenure
World Bank 
(this study)
$51 billion Comprehensive
governance reform
Table 4.3  Illustrative Rents Losses in Major Fisheries Assessed
with the Model Used in This Study 
Fishery
Base 
year
Base year 
harvest 
(1,000
tons)
Base year 
revenues 
(US$
millions)
Rents loss as
percentage 
of revenues
Vietnam Gulf of
Tonkin demersal
multigear   2006     235         178         29
Iceland cod multigear   2005     215         775         55
Namibia hake 
demersal trawl   2002     156           69       136
Peru anchoveta 
purse seine   2006     5,800         562         29
Bangladesh hilsa 
artisanal multigear   2005       99         199         58
Source: Selected case studies in progress FAO/World Bank (see appendix A4.4).
4.4  LINKS TO THE BROADER ECONOMY
The fisheries rents that are generated may be invested in productive physical,
human, or social capital, and the net gains from these investments can subse-
quently be reinvested. Thus, generation of fisheries rents allows fishing
economies to choose a higher economic growth path. For countries that are
highly dependent on fisheries, harnessing the potential economic growth effects
of fisheries rationalization can substantially improve general economic welfare.
4.4.1  Contributions to Economic Growth and GDP
The upstream and downstream economic links, or “multiplier effects,” add sig-
nificantly to the contribution of the fishing industry to the GDP and to wealth
creation, because the fishing industry is a base industry that supports eco-
nomic activity in other sectors of the economy including services (Arnason
1995; Agnarsson and Arnason 2007). In addition, the fishing industry is a dis-
proportionately strong foreign exchange earner in many developing countries,
and to the extent that the availability of foreign currency constrains economic
output, the economic benefits from the sector may be greater than is apparent
from the national accounts. For example, the contribution of the fishing indus-
try in the Pacific Islands has been estimated to be some 30 percent higher than
is usually presented in national accounts (Gillett and Lightfoot 2001; Zeller,
Booth, and Pauly 2006). An efficient and stable harvest subsector is the basis
for maintaining the sector’s contribution to GDP.
The study has focused on the marine fisheries to the point of landing, or
first sale. However, the seafood industry (including aquaculture) is a $400 bil-
lion global industry. The marine capture component accounts for an estimated
$212 billion, of which 65 percent, or $140 billion, represents the postharvest
economy (Davidsson 2007). The downstream benefits from a more efficient
harvest sector are considerable, as illustrated by the examples in box 4.1. The
upstream benefits are less evident, though fleet and processing plant construc-
tion and modernization can contribute to wealth and economic growth. 
The substantial value of noncommercial uses of fisheries is not included in
the rent estimates. For example, in the United States, the total national economic
impact from commercial finfish fisheries is 28.5 percent of the impact created by
marine recreational fisheries (Southwick Associates 2006), and in the case of the
striped bass resources, which are shared between the commercial and recre-
ational sectors, anglers harvest 1.28 times more fish, yet produce over 12 times
more economic activity as a result (Southwick Associates 2005). Healthy coral
reefs provide a further example. In addition to the lost benefits from fisheries,
destruction of coral reefs results in an estimated net present loss to society of $0.1
million to $1.0 million per square kilometer of reef (Cesar 1996).
The depletion of global fisheries cannot be attributed solely to fishing. Pol-
lution, destruction of critical habitats (such as wetlands and coastal zones),
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invasive species, climate change, and mineral extraction all play a role. However,
fishing is considered the greatest single cause of such depletion (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005).
The possible effect of a reduction in discards is not captured in the model.
Although by definition, discards generally have no commercial value to the
discarder, they may have an economic value. It is likely that under improved
fisheries management—a necessary step to gain the full benefits from fisheries—
the catch of previously discarded juveniles of commercially valuable species
would be reduced. As a consequence, the sustainable yield of valuable species
would probably increase, with a further increase in the estimate of potential
rents. For example, if reduced discards were to result in an increase of 5 million
metric tons in the global MSY, the estimate of forgone rents loss would increase
by some $6 billion per year.
4.4.2  The Effects of Higher Fuel and Food Prices
The impact of higher fuel and food prices on the rent estimate is unclear. The
effect depends on the interplay between the impact of the fuel price change on
the level of fishing effort; the price elasticity of demand for fish in economies
where the cost of the entire food basket increases; and the changes in per capita
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The Bering Sea Pollock Conservation Cooperative did not operate under an
ITQ system but created the incentives to generate substantial additional rents.
This was done by removing the less efficient vessels, extending the fishing sea-
son, and allowing the operators to concentrate on product quality. The yield
per ton of fish increased by approximately 10 percent, and recovery of by-
products such as high-value fish roe increased by 22 percent. The increased
benefits occurred in the postcapture operations, but as a result of a more
rational harvest regime and investments in the postharvest phase.
The estimated loss of rents in the harvest sector of Peru’s anchoveta fishery
is on the order of $200 million per year. Fleet capacity is some 2.5 to 3.4 times
the capacity required to harvest the total allowable catch set as a function of
the maximum sustainable yield, and the capacity of the fish meal plants is
some 2.9–3.8 times that required to process the catch. The fishing season in the
world’s largest fishery has been reduced to less than 60 days per year with sub-
stantial loss of quality and wastage. If, under a rationalized and modernized
postharvest sector, the current production of lower-grade fish meal graduated
to higher-grade fish meal and a greater recovery of fish oil, the additional net
postharvest revenues generated would be an the order of $228 million per year. 
Source: Wilen and Richardson 2003; Paredes 2008.
Box 4.1  Downstream Efficiency Gains in Alaska and Peru
incomes, which underlie the demand for fish. The outcome of this interplay is
likely to be specific to the economy of an individual fishery and the markets for
the products of that fishery (table 4.4).
Fuel constitutes a significant part of the cost of fishing, and the price of fuel
almost doubled between 2004, the base year, and 2007 (U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Agency 2007). The recent fluctuations in oil prices greatly increase uncer-
tainty, but the gradual increase in oil prices between 2004 and 2008 suggest
that the cost of fishing in the base year may underestimate the cost in the
future. For example, the variable costs of fishing effort in March 2008 were
some 10 percent higher than they were in 2004, given the share of fuel in vari-
able fishing costs. This increase would reduce the estimated rents loss com-
pared with the base year 2004 by about $4 billion. 
4.5  SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
The rents loss estimates range from a minimum $30 billion (the logistic func-
tion and a 10 percent lower MSY) to over $90 billion (the Fox function and 20
percent higher MSY). The results of the sensitivity of the rents loss estimates
up to 20 percent deviations in the input data are illustrated in figure 4.1 for the
logistic (Schaefer) and the Fox biomass growth functions, respectively.
As can be seen in the figure, the rents loss estimate is most sensitive to
changes in the assumed global maximum sustainable yield and in the volume
of landings in the base year. When the values for the other input data are kept
constant, the estimated rents loss increases with an increase in the value of the
MSY estimate and decreases as the value of landings in the base year increases.
The estimated rents loss is much less sensitive to changes in the values for other
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Table 4. 4  Effects of Fuel and Food Prices Increases on Economic
Rents
Fuel price increases may: Food price increases may: 
Increase rents:
• if fishing effort decreases as a 
result of higher costs
• if fishing patterns change to less
fuel-intensive modes
Increase rents:
• if the increase in fish prices more than
compensates for higher harvest costs
• if forage (fish meal) fisheries redirect
catches to higher-value food products
Decrease rents:
• if fuel subsidies increase
• if the aggregate global fishery
becomes less profitable
Decrease rents:
• if lower-cost aquaculture products
permanently capture market share
from marine capture fishery products
• if food price increases stimulate
increased fishing effort
Source: Authors.
input data such as the price of landed catch, the schooling parameter, and the
elasticity of demand. 
Based on stipulated stochastic distributions for the input data and calcu-
lated stochastic distribution of the rents loss estimates, a 90 percent confidence
interval for the estimated rents loss is $31 to $70 billion, with the most proba-
ble estimate on the order of $50 billion (table 4.5). 
RESULTS 47
Figure 4.1  Sensitivity Analysis of the Results for the Logistic and Fox Models
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Details of the stochastic distributions for the input data and calculations of
the resulting stochastic distribution of the rents loss estimates are described in
detail in appendix 3. The stochastic distribution of the rents loss estimates is
non-normal and skewed to the right (longer tail to the left). Combining the
logistic (Schaefer) and the Fox models in one distribution with equal proba-
bility leads to density and distribution functions as illustrated in figure 4.2. 
NOTE
1. A representative series of studies using a common methodology is currently being
undertaken by FAO and the World Bank under the World Bank’s PROFISH Partner-
ship. Results of several of these studies are presented in table A4.4 in appendix 4.
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Table 4.5  Confidence Intervals for Rent Loss Estimate
Confidence interval Range of estimated rents loss (US$ billions)
95 percent                               26–73
90 percent                               31–70
80 percent                               37–67
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.2  Density and Distribution Functions for the Estimated Rents
Loss for Logistic, Fox, and Combined Logistic and Fox Functions
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5.1  FISHERIES REFORM MAKES ECONOMIC SENSE
The study shows that an increasing number of fish stocks are overex-ploited; overcapacity in fishing fleets remains high; the real incomelevel of fishers remains depressed; and fish prices have stagnated, even
as the costs of harvesting continue to increase. Aquaculture has grown to
approximately 50 percent of food fish production, which has contributed to
supply and price stabilization as demand for seafood has increased, particu-
larly in China.
Many thriving and profitable fisheries disguise the fact that at the aggregate
level, the economic health of the world’s marine capture fisheries is in a state
of chronic and advancing malaise that has compromised resilience to fuel
price increases, to depressed fish prices, and to the effects of climate variabil-
ity and change. The estimated loss of potential net benefits is on the order of
$50 billion per year for a cumulative loss of over $2 trillion since 1974. The
annual loss is equivalent to approximately 64 percent of the landed value of
the global catch, or 71 percent of the value of global fish trade in the base year
(2004). These estimates, however, exclude the additional value of the environ-
mental benefits of healthy marine ecosystems (such as tourism benefits from
healthy coral reefs) and the value of efficiency gains along the value chain. In
addition, the full costs of illegal fishing activities and subsidies may not be
fully reflected, and the estimated loss of potential benefits is thus conservative. 
These are among the many reasons why the economic objectives—increasing
the net benefits and wealth from fisheries—need to be at the center stage of
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efforts to resolve the crisis in marine fisheries. Public awareness and under-
standing of the potential and actual flows of economic benefits can inform the
political economy of reform and help leaders move toward socially responsible
and sustainable fisheries underpinned by sound scientific advice. National fish-
eries policies would benefit from a greater focus on maximizing net benefits and
choosing economic or social yield as an objective rather than continuing to
manage fisheries with the purely biological objective of maximum sustainable
yield as the key reference point. 
5.2  REBUILDING GLOBAL FISH CAPITAL
Most marine wild fish resources are considered to be the property of nations.
Governments are generally entrusted with the stewardship of these national
assets, and their accepted role is to ensure that these assets are used as produc-
tively as possible, for both current and future generations. The depletion of a
nation’s fish stocks constitutes a loss of national wealth, or the nation’s stock of
natural capital. Similarly, the depletion of global fish stocks constitutes a loss of
global natural capital. The scale of these losses— the sunken billions—justifies
increased efforts by national economic policy makers to reverse this perennial
hemorrhage of national and global economic benefits. 
There is enormous potential to rebuild global fish stocks and wealth and to
increase the net benefits that countries could derive from their commercial
marine fisheries resources. The rents may not be fully recoverable and
efforts to rebuild global fish wealth incur economic, social, and political
costs. Nevertheless, the sheer scale of the rent drain provides ample grounds
for economic policy makers and planners to direct their attention to the
rebuilding of national, regional, and global fish capital. Economically healthy
marine fisheries can deliver an unending flow of economic benefits, a natural
bounty from good stewardship, rather than constituting a net drain on society
and on global wealth.
Rising fuel prices, declining fish stocks, and the need for greater fish stock
resilience in the face of additional climate change pressures further reinforces
the arguments for concerted national and international actions to rebuild fish
wealth. Rising food prices, a growing fish food gap for over 1 billion people
dependent on fish as their primary source of protein, and the ungainly carbon
footprint of some fisheries add to the rationale for reversing the rent drain. 
5.2.1  Subsidies
The increase in the prices of fuel and food during 2008 combined to strengthen
pressure for subsidies. Such pressures stem not only from the harvest sector of
the fisheries industry but also from the upstream and downstream economy
dependent on the sector, and from consumers in countries where fish is a
staple component of the diet. 
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The World Bank has recently addressed the subsidies issue. The World Bank
does not advocate subsidies as a response to recent food and energy price
increases, but supports careful analysis, monitoring, and balancing of compet-
ing needs for energy and food security (World Bank 2008a). 
The World Development Report 2008 (World Bank 2007c) poses two ques-
tions with regard to input subsidies. First, “do the economic benefits exceed the
costs of subsidies?” The evidence presented in this and other studies shows that,
in the case of fisheries the answer is almost invariably “no’’ and that the negative
environmental externalities generated by input subsidies are considerable.
The second question is “are input subsidies justified on social grounds?”
The answer depends on whether the alternatives are more cost-effective. In
the case of fisheries, subsidies often constitute a politically expedient means
of sidestepping the challenge of addressing the alternatives, including the
challenge of helping fisher households to take up other gainful economic
opportunities. Often conceived as a short-term intervention, subsidies tend
to become entrenched at high cost to society and frequently confer more
benefits on the more affluent (for example, vessel owners) than on the
intended targets (for example, vessel crew or the poorer consumers). The use
of subsidies implies that solutions to the crisis in fisheries lie within the sec-
tor rather than through local, regional, and national economic growth. By
creating perverse incentives for greater investment and fishing effort in over-
stressed fisheries, input subsidies tend to reinforce the sector’s poverty trap
and undermine the creation of surplus that could be invested in alternatives,
including education and health. 
The World Bank has suggested, that if input subsidies are to be used, they
should be temporary, as part of a broader strategy to improve fisheries man-
agement and enhance productivity. The Bank has emphasized investing in
quality public goods, such as science, infrastructure, and human capital;
improving the investment climate and access to credit; and strengthening gov-
ernance of natural resources, including through secure user and property rights
and collective action taken by a strengthened civil society (World Bank 2008a).
5.2.2  The Costs of Reform
The transition to economically healthy fisheries will require investment.
Assessment of the costs of reform and the improved governance required to
capture increased net benefits from marine capture fisheries lies beyond the
scope of this study, as does an assessment of the proportion of the potential net
benefits that can feasibly be captured. The benefits from stock recovery accrue
over a longer period and are shrouded in the uncertainties of the ecosystem.
Public funds have been used to finance various elements of reform includ-
ing fisher retraining and early retirement. Buyback schemes are one of the
many strategies deployed to improve the economic performance of fisheries
and are generally financed by public funds, although some cost recovery has
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accrued through charges on the remaining fishers. In Norway, Japan, and else-
where, private funds have supported buybacks (Curtis and Squires 2007), and
dedicated financial instruments have also been proposed (Dalton 2005). 
The recurrent costs of management are not addressed in the model pre-
sented here. Substantial investment is needed in the transition process to eco-
nomically healthy fisheries. The investment is required not only in building
technical capacity for fisheries management but in the institutional fabric of
fisheries tenure at all levels—the fishers, the administration, and the political
levels. The recurrent costs of fishery management may decline under an eco-
nomically healthy fisheries regime. For example, illegal fishing is likely to
decline and the costs of enforcement may decline. The cost of the regulatory
burden on the fisher may also decline. The allocation of the management cost
burden between public and private sectors presents challenges both for fiscal
policy and management practice.
5.2.3  Net Benefits and Tenure
It has long been understood that because the benefits of use are individual but
costs are shared, the net benefits from use of common pool resources, such as
fish stocks, will tend to dissipate (Gordon 1954; Hardin 1968). The nature of
the rights over the resources plays an important role in determining the extent
of that loss of net benefits, and it is suggested that in general the more clearly
defined and enforceable the rights, the less the benefit loss (Scott 1955). In
many countries, marine fishery resources are considered to belong to the
nation, and governments are charged with the stewardship of this public trust.
In some instances, this has undermined the traditional rights systems observed
by local communities and led to a de facto open access condition. Because the
public or common pool character of marine fish resources is often deeply
embedded in law and practice, strengthening marine fisheries is often a com-
plex undertaking that faces political, social, and legal challenges, requiring a
good understanding of traditional rights systems, accepted practices, and cul-
ture. Nevertheless, to increase the net benefits from fisheries, the issue of tenure
must be addressed (de Soto 2000).
The purpose of this study is not to be prescriptive with regard to marine
fisheries tenure, but to raise awareness of this link between tenure and net
benefits (Costello, Gaines, and Lynham 2008). A greater understanding of this
link implies public awareness of the potential and actual economic benefits
from marine fisheries and how these benefits can be captured rather than dis-
sipated. It calls for public awareness concerning who benefits and to what extent
society underwrites those benefits. It calls for greater understanding of how a
balance between secure tenure and the social responsibility for resource stew-
ardship can be achieved at local and national levels. Figure A4.1 in appendix 4
demonstrates that quantifies the increasing wealth generally attributed to
strengthened tenure in selected New Zealand and Icelandic fisheries.
52 THE SUNKEN BILLIONS
5.2.4  Sustainable Fisheries Are Primarily a Governance Issue
As stated in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Imple-
mentation, sound science and an ecosystem approach are fundamental under-
pinnings of sustainable fisheries (Articles 30, 36). However, the principal
drivers of the overexploitation in marine capture fisheries and the causes of
the dissipation of the resource rents and loss of potential economic benefits
are the perverse economic incentives embedded in the fabric of fisheries har-
vesting regimes, reflecting a failure of fisheries governance. 
Sustainable fisheries are primarily a governance issue, and the application of
the fishery science without addressing the political economy of fisheries is
unlikely to rebuild marine fish wealth.1 Restoration of marine fish wealth and
rebuilding the flow of net benefits implies fisheries governance reforms with an
increased emphasis on the economic and social processes, informed by, rather
than centered on, biological considerations and recognizing solutions and
opportunities provided in the broader economy outside the fisheries sector.
5.2.5  Fishery Reform Can Advance along the Axes 
of Sustainability, Productivity, and Equity
Three axes of reform can be considered. A sustainability axis would maintain
ecosystem and intergenerational integrity while underpinning the physical
basis for economic health. A productivity axis would aim to maximize rents by
focusing on the economic efficiency of the harvesting regime. An equity axis
would qualify the productivity aspiration, addressing the social dimension of
resource allocation or benefit flows. 
The maximum economic yield (or a similar proxy) is generally a more con-
servative harvesting target than maximum sustainable yield (Grafton, Kompass,
and Hilborn 2007). Framed within a broader ecosystem approach, it satisfies
both the sustainability and rent-maximizing objectives. Advancing along the
equity axis, the use of fisheries as a social safety net, for example, may involve
some sacrifice of the productivity targets. By contrast, a narrow focus of reform
on productivity and rent maximization will fail to address the real social and
political costs of rebuilding fish wealth.
A reform agenda calls for a greater understanding of the political and social
processes and drivers of change in fisheries. It calls for approaches to disman-
tling perverse incentives through appropriate tenure and property rights systems
and the phasing out of subsidies that enhance fishing effort and fishing capacity.
Guidance is available on some elements of reform processes, such as limited
entry (Townsend 1990; Cunningham and Bostock 2005); buyback schemes
(Curtis and Squires 2007; Clark, Munro, and Sumaila 2007); and individual
transferable quotas and property rights (Committee to Review Individual Fish-
ing Quotas 1999; Shotton 1999; WHAT 2000; Grafton et al. 2008). Guidance is
also available on community rights (Christy 1999; Willmann 2000); on gover-
nance and corruption (World Bank 2007a; World Bank and IUCN in press); and
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on the political economy of reform and the durability of reforms (OECD 2008;
Kjorup 2007). However, greater knowledge is required about the assessment and
mitigation of social and political costs, the financing of reform, the timescale
and sequencing of reform activities within political and investment cycles, and
consensus building among competing stakeholders and their political con-
stituencies. Fisheries reform can also be seen as part of a broader public policy
agenda embracing fiscal reforms, pathways out of poverty, and greater trans-
parency in stewardship and accounting for natural capital. 
A constructive dialogue on the political economy of reform requires a com-
mon understanding among stakeholders of the potential net benefits from
marine fisheries and of the current level of benefits and transparency in the
allocation of those benefits. A constructive dialogue on reform will require
knowledge of the political and social costs and benefits of reform options and
informed stakeholder discussion on the alternatives (including transitions out
of fisheries). Reforms may take time and require forging a political consensus
and vision spanning changes of government. Experience shows that successful
reforms may require champions or crises to catalyze the process. 
5.2.6  Strengthening the Socioeconomic Dimension 
of the Fisheries Dialogue
A target set out in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of
Implementation is the restoration of fish stocks to maximum sustainable
yield levels by 2015. Harvesting at the MSY level is unlikely to capture a sub-
stantial part of the economic rents and can be regarded as a minimum tar-
get. The MSY target also implies a focus on the fish, and tilts toward a single
species approach, rather than focusing on the underlying economic drivers,
the political and social challenges to sharing the fish wealth, and the process
of reform. 
Nevertheless, as a first step in tracking progress toward the restoration of
fish stocks, countries, the primary global stakeholders, could report both on
the state of fish stocks within their jurisdictional waters (see, for example,
NMFS 2008; Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
2008), and on the level and distribution of benefits from the national fish wealth.
5.2.7  Accounting for Fish Wealth Is a National Role
It is a matter of considerable concern that the depletion of fish wealth—natural
capital—normally does not show up in the national accounts of countries.
Because of weak property rights in national and international fisheries and
because of difficulties in establishing market prices for these resources, fisheries
assets fall outside the asset boundary of the System of National Accounts 1993
(the internationally recognized system for maintaining national accounts). As a
result, a fishing country can run down fish resources and thus temporarily
increase catch rates, which show up as an addition in the national accounts,
without having to subtract the corresponding reduction in fish stock capital. In
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other words, fishing nations have drawn upon the fishing sector’s opaque
natural capital account to “artificially” improve the nation’s GDP and simul-
taneously use this capital to (temporarily) support the operating accounts of
fishers and the fishing companies. 
Ideally, the system of national accounts should, as a matter of course,
include changes in natural capital just as it does for man-made capital. Given
their economic importance, the omission of natural assets such as fish stocks
from the national accounts entails a substantial oversight in economic
accounting. National accounts including changes in natural capital are often
referred to as green accounts, and specific guidance is readily available on envi-
ronmental accounting for fisheries (UN and FAO 2004, Danielsson 2005).
Because of the deficit of information on the economic health of the world’s
fisheries, the World Bank report “Where Is the Wealth of Nations?” was unable
to take account of fisheries. Greater awareness of the scale of this capital asset
depletion at the level of national policy makers and economic planners could
build support for reform processes. 
5.2.8  Rights to Harvest Fish Wealth Are Distinct from Rights 
to Benefit from Fish Wealth
The notion that harvesters (fishers) have an exclusive, rather than a partial and
conditional, right to the benefits from marine fisheries has tended to obscure
the quest for increased social and economic benefits to society as a whole. This
study shows that, in aggregate, the benefits to society as a whole are negative—
that society underwrites the sector, through subsidies, by paying the costs of
fisheries management, and through depletion of capital (fish wealth). 
Rights and obligations are mutually supporting elements of governance,
and strengthened marine resource property rights demand both clarity on and
respect for the accompanying obligations (Fisman and Miguel 2006). 
Many traditional regimes distinguished rights to harvest from rights to ben-
efits in acknowledgement that society at large also had a claim to the benefits
of the harvest (Johannes 1978). The same principles are successfully applied in
a modern setting, for example in fisheries in New Zealand (see figure A4.1 in
appendix 4) and the Shetland Islands, where the tenure is vested in the com-
munity and harvest rights are largely “firewalled” from the fundamental wealth
creation and capital formation functions. 
5.3  SUMMARY: THE WAY FORWARD
1. Use the results of this study to raise awareness among leaders, stakeholders,
and the public on the potential economic and social benefits from
improved fisheries governance.
2. Foster country-level and fishery-level estimates of the potential economic
and social benefits of fisheries reform and of the social and political costs
of reform as a basis for national-, or fishery-level dialogue.
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3. Build a portfolio of experiences on the process of fisheries reform with a
focus on the political economy of reform, process design, change man-
agement, social safety nets, and the timescale and financing. Draw on the
knowledge and lessons of reforms in other sectors, in particular with
regard to the impact on the poor and the effectiveness and equity of
adjustment mechanisms.
4. Progressively identify a portfolio of reform pathways based on a consensus
vision for the future of a fishery founded on transparency in the distribu-
tion of benefits and reforms that increase social equity. Common elements
of such pathways could include effective stakeholder consultation processes;
sound social and economic justifications for change; and an array of social
and technical options, including decentralization and comanagement initia-
tives to create more manageable fishery units. A reform process will bend
the trusted tools of fisheries management to new tasks. Sound scientific
advice, technical measures such as closed seasons, and effective registration
of vessels and existing fishing rights are likely to form synergies with poverty
reduction strategies, transitions out of fisheries, social safety nets, and com-
munity comanagement.
5. Review fiscal policies in order to phase out subsidies that enhance fishing
effort and fishing capacity and to redirect public support measures toward
strengthening fisheries management capacities and institutions and avoid-
ing social and economic hardships in the fisheries reform process.
6. In an effort to comply with the World Summit on Sustainable Development
Plan of Implementation call for restoration of fish stocks, countries could,
on a timely basis provide to their public an assessment of the state of
national fish stocks and take measures to address the underreporting or
misreporting of catches. 
7. Countries can further justify reforms in fisheries by recognizing that
responsible fisheries build resilience to the effects of climate change and
reduce the carbon footprint of the industry. 
NOTE
1. The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO 1995) provides an overarching
framework for sustainable fisheries.
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Economic rent is defined as “the payment (imputed or otherwise) to afactor in fixed supply.”1 This definition is formulated in terms of a fac-tor of production and can be extended to cover any restricted variable,
such as fish catch.
Figure A1.1, showing a demand curve and a supply curve, is often used to
illustrate Ricardo’s theory of land rents. In the figure, the market price is p.
However, because the quantity of the factor (for example, land) is fixed, the
corresponding supply, y, would be forthcoming even if the price were zero, and
so the price, p, may be regarded as a surplus per unit of quantity. The total sur-
plus is represented by the rectangle p.y, which also represents the economic
rents attributable to the limited factor, y. 
The economic rents depicted in figure A1.1 represent rental income to the
owner of the factor in fixed supply (for example, land) who rents it out to
users. The economic rents do not, however, represent the total economic ben-
efits of the supply y. These benefits are measured by the sum of economic rents
and the demanders’ surplus represented by the upper triangle in the diagram.
Thus, in the case depicted in figure A1.1, total benefits, those of the owner plus
those of the demanders,2 would be greater than economic rents.
However, in fisheries (as, indeed, in most other natural resource use), the
quantity of supply is not fixed. At each point of time, it is usually possible to
extract more or less from the resource stock. Usually in common pool fish-
eries, the demand will push the supply to y0 (see figure A1.1), at which point
there are no economic rents. At the other extreme, supply may be limited by
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a management regime with the objective of maximizing fisheries rents.
Between these extremes, the various fisheries management regimes restrict the
harvest quantity at different levels and in different ways. 
A cost is associated with resource reduction (a variant of capital reduction
cost) for each level of harvest from the stock. This is entirely separate from the
cost of the harvesting activity as such, which is included in the demand curve.
This cost is the economically appropriate supply price of fish.3 The resource
reduction cost increases with the quantity extracted, or level of harvest. This
defines an economically appropriate supply curve for harvest (Arnason 2006),
as illustrated in figure A1.2. 
The optimally managed fishery will set the actual quantity of supply (allow-
able harvest) at y, corresponding to the intersection between the supply and
demand curves in A1.2. At this level point, there will be a price of supply denoted
by p in the diagram. The supply y gives rise to fisheries rents as indicated by the
rectangle in the figure.4 Under conditions of open access, the supply is not
restricted and the quantity of extraction will be at y0 which corresponds to no
rents at all. 
Measurement of fisheries rents means estimating areas represented by
such rectangles and requires estimates of the demand curve for harvests. The
demand curve for harvests follows from the profit function of the fishing
industry. A simple form of this function is written as 
≥ (y, x), (1.1)
where y is the harvest level and x the biomass of the stock. The demand curve
for harvest is defined as the instantaneous marginal profits from harvest
(Arnason 2006) and may be written as
≥ y (y, x). (1.2)
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Figure A1.1  Economic Rents
Source: Authors’ depiction.
Accordingly, fisheries rents are defined as
R (y, x) = ≥ y (y, x). y. (1.3)
An estimation of fisheries rents requires a determination of the marginal profits
of the fishing industry. To estimate maximum economic rents or economic
rents in equilibrium, a bioeconomic model of the fishery is needed. 
NOTES
1. As defined by Alchian (1987) in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and build-
ing on the classical theory by Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817).
2. Some authors refer to the demanders’ surplus as intramarginal rents. See, for exam-
ple, Coglan and Pascoe (1999) for the case of fisheries and Blaug (2000) more gen-
erally. DFID (2004) provides a short overview of rents in fisheries, and Clark and
Munro (1975) provide an overview of fisheries and capital theory.
3. Also called user cost by Scott (1955) and shadow price of the resource by Dasgupta
and Heal (1979).
4. The rectangle, represented by the multiple p.y in the figure, corresponds to economic
rents in the traditional (Smith-Ricardian) sense as defined by Alchian.
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Figure A1.2  Illustrative Resource Rents in a Resource Extraction Industry
Source: Authors’ depiction.

This appendix sets out the details of the global fisheries modelemployed in this study and explains how it is applied. 
THE BASIC MODEL
The basic model is the following aggregative fisheries model:
(biomass growth function). (2.1)
y = Y (e, x) (harvesting function). (2.2)
p = p. Y (e, x) (profit function). (2.3)
(fisheries rents).1 (2.4)
Equation 2.1 describes net biomass growth, denoted by the derivative,
. The variable x represents the level of biomass and y harvest. The
function G(x) represents the natural growth of the biomass before harvesting.
Equation 2.2 explains the harvest as a function of fishing effort, e, and biomass.
Equation 2.3 defines profits as the difference between revenues, p.Y (e, x),
where p denotes the average net landed price of fish and costs are represented
by the cost function C(e). Equation 2.4 specifies fisheries rents, R. This, as
explained in appendix 1, is formally defined as ( ) .∂ ∂ ⋅π y y
x x t≡ ∂ ∂
R y,x y p C e
e
y
yy e≡ = −
∂
∂
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
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Of the six variables in this model, that is, x, y,p, R, p, and e, the first four may
be seen as endogenous, that is, determined within the fishery. The fifth, price,
is exogenous, determined by market conditions outside the fishery. The sixth,
fishing effort, e, may be seen as the control variable, that is, the variable whose
values may be selected to maximize benefits from the fishery. 
THE SPECIFIC MODEL
The basic model comprises three elementary functions; the natural growth
function, G(x); the harvesting function, Y(e, x); and the cost function, C(e).
The specific model is defined by deciding on the form of these functions. 
Two variants of the biomass growth function G(x) are used: the logistic
function (Volterra 1923) and the Fox function (Fox 1970). As explained previ-
ously, the main difference between these two functions is that the Fox function
exhibits higher biomass growth at relatively low biomass levels and thus is
more resilient to high levels of fishing effort than the logistic function. 
G(x) = a . x – b . x2, (Logistic) (2.5)
G(x) = a . x – b . ln(x) . x (Fox 1970). (2.6)
For harvesting, the generalized Schaefer (1954) form is selected:
Y (e, x) = q . e . xb, (2.7)
where the coefficient b indicates the degree of schooling behavior by the fish
(normally The coefficient q is often referred to as the catchability
coefficient. 
For the cost function, the following linear form is chosen: 
C (e) = c . e + fk , (2.8)
where c represents marginal variable costs and fk fixed costs.
Under these functional specifications the complete model becomes: 
,
or (biomass growth functions). (2.9)
y = q . e . xb (harvesting function). (2.10)
p = p . y – c . e – fk (profit function). (2.11)
(fisheries rents). (2.12)R p y
c
q
y x b= ⋅ −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
−
⋅ ⋅
x x x x y= − −α β⋅ ⋅ ⋅ln( )
x x x y= ⋅ ⋅− − ,α β 2
b ∈[0,1]).
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Assuming biomass equilibrium, that is, x. = 0, it is possible to deduce from
equations 2.9 and 2.10 the equilibrium or sustainable yield curves as functions
of fishing effort for the two biomass growth functions. The corresponding
equilibrium revenue curves are illustrated in figure A2.1, where the graph of the
cost curve is also depicted. The resulting equilibrium diagram is usually referred
to as the sustainable fisheries model (see, for example, Hannesson 1993). 
The discontinuity in both equilibrium revenue functions illustrated in
 figure A2.1 is a common feature in real fisheries (see, for example, Clark 1976).
In this particular case it occurs because a degree of schooling behavior (b < 1)
has been assumed.
Equilibrium profits from the fishery are maximized at a fishing effort level
where the distance between equilibrium revenues and costs is greatest. As can
be seen from figure A2.1, this occurs at different fishing effort levels for the two
biomass growth functions. 
Equilibrium fisheries rents are not generally identifiable from a diagram such
as figure A2.1, and fisheries rents are generally not maximized at the same effort
level that maximizes profits. However, for the specific model of this study, rents
may be identified as the difference between equilibrium revenues and the variable
costs curve (that is, a curve parallel to the cost curve but passing through the ori-
gin). Also, in this specific model, the rents and profits maximizing fishing effort
levels coincide, although maximum rents may well exceed maximum profits.
A condensed form of the model may be obtained by combining equations
2.10 and 2.11 to yield 
(profit function). (2.13)
This condensed form of the model, that is, equations 2.9, 2.12, and 2.13, shows
that knowledge of fishing effort is not needed to run the model, and that
π = −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −
−p y
c
q
y x fkb⋅ ⋅ ⋅
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Figure A2.1  The Equilibrium Fisheries Model
Source: Authors’ depiction. 
marginal costs and catchability, c and q, do not play an independent role in this
model. The ratio of the two (c /q) may be regarded as a single coefficient,
referred to as “normalized marginal cost.” 
ESTIMATION OF MODEL INPUTS
The “specific fisheries model” (that is, equations 2.9, 2.12, and 2.13) contains
six unknown coefficients These have to be estimated from
data or determined in some other way. The model also contains five unknown
variables, namely, x, y, p, and R as well as the change in biomass, . The model
can be used to solve for three of these variables endogenously. The other two have
to be either estimated from data or determined in some other way. In the rents
loss calculations of this study, current or base year rents are compared to maxi-
mum equilibrium rents. For the calculations of maximum equilibrium rents,
estimates of these two variables are not required. First, the equilibrium biomass
is constant, so . Second, the harvest, y, is determined by the maximization
exercise. For the current rents calculations, estimates of base year harvest and
biomass growth, y(t∗) and , respectively, were obtained. The model inputs
(coefficients and variables) that have to be estimated are listed in table A2.1. 
There are many ways to obtain estimates of the model input data listed in
table A2.1. Because the quality of some global fisheries data sets is poor, the
study has elected a procedure that minimizes data requirements. The global
data needed are listed in table A2.2. The procedure is summarized as a series of
estimation formulas listed in table A2.3. These formulas can be verified by the
appropriate manipulation of the specific model above. 
The change in fishing effort from an initial to an optimal fishery can be cal-
culated using the same basic data listed in table A2.2. More precisely, it can be
shown that
(2.14)
where ‘∗’ indicate the final equilibrium levels of variables and ‘t∗’ the base year
values.
If the numerical value of e(t∗) is known, the numerical value of e∗ can be
calculated for this expression. Otherwise, e∗ can be calculated as a fraction of
e(t∗), that is, as an index.
The input values used for the estimations and their respective sources are
listed in table A2.4. 
In a long-run economic equilibrium, all costs are variable (Varian 1984).
This is because in the long-run equilibrium, all capital (the source of fixed
costs) has been adjusted. Therefore, in the movement to long-run equilibrium,
all so-called fixed costs are in fact variable. In this study, the equilibrium (or
x⋅ = 0
x
α β, , , , ,c
q
b p f k
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ .
x t*⋅ ( )
e e t
p y
p y t t
∗ ⋅ ∗
⋅ ∗ ∗
⋅ ∗ ∗
= =
−
−
ϕ ϕ Π
Π
( ) where 
( ) ( )
, and,
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long-run) maximum rents are going to be compared to current rents. There-
fore, within the framework of this study, any fixed costs experienced in the
base year are taken to be variable when considering the movement to the rents-
maximizing equilibrium. This is equivalent to setting the fixed cost ratio in the
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Table A2.1  Summary of Model Coefficients and Variables That
Need to Be Estimated
Coefficient or
variable Characterization
Permissible
values
Biological coefficients
Biomass growth function a Intrinsic growth rate (only
for the logistic function)
α > 0
Biomass growth function b b> 0
Harvesting function b Schooling parameter 0 <b 1≤
Economic coefficients
Cost function c / q Marginal cost ratio c/q > 0
Cost function f k Fixed costs fk ≥ 0
Revenues p Net landings price p > 0
Variables (in base year, t*)
Landings y (t*) Volume of landings y(t*) ≥ 0
Biomass growth (t*) Biomass growth
Source: Authors’ models.
x
Table A2.2  Data for Estimation of Model Coefficients and Variables
Biological data Symbol
Maximum sustainable yield               MSY
Biomass carrying capacity               Xmax
The schooling parameter                   B
Fisheries data in a base year t*
Biomass growth in year t*               (t*)
Landings in year t*               y(t*)
Price of landings in year t*             p(t*)
Profits in year t*             π(t*)
Fixed cost ratio in year t* (fk / TC (t*))             e (t*)
Source: Authors’ models.
x
base year equal to zero. Note that this does not imply that the fixed costs in the
base year are ignored. They are included but regarded as variable costs.
On the basis of the empirical assumptions listed in table A2.4 and the for-
mulas in table A2.3, the model coefficients can be calculated. The results are
listed in table A2.5.
With the empirical assumption and the estimates above, the condensed
form of the global fisheries model employed in this study becomes: 
(logistic biomass growth).
(Fox biomass growth).
(2.15)
(profits for the logistic).
(2.16)
(profits for the Fox).Π ⋅ ⋅ ⋅( , ) 0.918 23.2
0.7y x y y x= − ,
Π ⋅ ⋅ ⋅( , ) 0.918 32.8 0.7y x y y x= − ,
x x x x= −3.486 0.57 ln( )⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ,
x x x= −0.839 0.002 2⋅ ⋅ ,
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Table A2.3  Formulas to Calculate Model Parameters
Unknowns Formula
Logistic function
Biomass in base year,
Fox function
Biomass in base year,
Normalized marginal cost,
Fixed costs, 
The schooling parameter, bˆ B
Landings in year t*, y(t*)
Price of landings in year t*, p(t*)
Source: Authors’ models.
αˆ
αˆ αˆ = 4 ⋅
MSY
Xmax
βˆ
βˆ
βˆ = 4 2⋅ MSYXmax
αˆ = MSY ln X
exp
Xmax max
⋅ ⋅( )
βˆ = MSY exp
Xmax
⋅
xˆ t*( )
c
q
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
∧
fˆ k
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(fisheries rents for the logistic).
(fisheries rents for the Fox).
(2.17)
In the same way as in figure A2.1, the essence of the empirical global fish-
eries model can be illustrated graphically (figure A2.2). 
R y x y y x( , ) 0.918 0.7= −⋅ ⋅ ⋅23 2.
R y x y y x( , ) 0.918 32.8 0.7= −⋅ ⋅ ⋅
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Table A2.4  Empirical Values and Assumptions for Estimation of 
Model Coefficients
Input data Units Value
Biological data
Maximum sustainable yield MSY m. metric tons 95
Carrying capacity Xmax m. metric tons 453.0
Fisheries data in base year (2004)
Biomass growth in base year t* x˙(t* ) m. metric tons –2
Landings in base year t* y(t*) m. metric ton 85.7
Price of landings in base year t* p(t*) 1000 $/ton 0.92
Profits in base year t* ≥(t*) billion $ –5
Fixed cost ratio in base year t* e (t*) ratio 0
The schooling parameter b no units 0.7
Elasticity of demand with respect 
to biomass
d no units 0.24
Effort (index or real base year effort)
Fishing effort (fleet) in base year e(t*) index 1.00
Source: Authors’ models.
Table A2.5  Calculated Model Coefficients (Implied)
Variable Logistic Fox
Biomass growth parameter, a 0.839 3.486
Biomass growth parameter, b 0.002 0.570
Biomass, x (2004) 148.4 92.3
Normalized marginal costs, c /q 32.3 23.2
Schooling parameter, b 0.7 0.7
Fixed costs, fk 0 0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
NOTE
1. In appendix 1, rent was defined as where is the first 
derivative of the profit function, that is, marginal profits. For this particular
fisheries model with fishing effort rather than harvest as a control variable,
Πy ey,x p C e e y( )= ( ) .− ⋅∂ ∂
Πy y,x( )R (y,x) yy≡ ⋅Π ,
68 THE SUNKEN BILLIONS
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
120.0
U
S$
 b
ill
io
ns
Fishing effort (index)
0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40
Logistic
Fox
CostsSustainable revenues Fox function
Sustainable revenues Logistic function
Costs
Figure A2.2  Graphical Illustration of the Global Fishery 
Source: Authors.
Because of the uncertainties concerning the empirical values andassumptions underlying the global fisheries model, the resulting rentloss estimates should be regarded as stochastic with associated proba-
bility distributions. Because the rents loss calculations involve a complex non-
linear function of the empirical data and assumptions, the analytic equations
for the probability distribution of these estimates are not readily obtainable. To
generate confidence intervals for the rents loss, reasonable probability distri-
butions for the empirical data and assumptions are specified, and Monte Carlo
stochastic simulations (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993; Fishman 1996) were
used to generate probability distributions for the model inputs and outcomes
(fisheries rents and fisheries rents loss). 
Probability distributions for the stochastic input parameters listed below
were generated on the basis of 2,000 simulations drawing from the distribu-
tions specified here. The stochastic specifications are summarized in table
A3.1, and the resulting outcomes and distributions are illustrated in the figures
that follow. 
1. Global maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
2. Global biomass carrying capacity (Xmax)
3. Biomass growth in the base year (x.)
4. Landings in the base year (y)
5. Landings price (p)
6. Profits in the base year (prof/P )
7. Schooling parameter (b)
8. Elasticity of demand (D)
The remaining input parameter, the fixed cost ratio (e), is assumed to be non-
stochastic (see appendix 2). 
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Stochastic Specifications
and Confidence Intervals
A P P E N D I X  T H R E E
OUTCOMES OF THE MONTE CARLO STOCHASTIC
SIMULATIONS
Logistic Model (figure A3.1)
■ Nonnormal distribution
■ Mean rents loss: $43.0 billion 
■ Median rents loss: $44.5 billion 
■ Mode rents loss (approximately) $48 billion
■ Standard deviation: $8.8 billion
■ 95 percent confidence interval ($ billion): [20.2, 55.7]. 
Fox Model (figure A3.2)
■ Approximately normal distribution
■ Mean rents loss: $59.0 billion
■ Median rents loss: $59.2 billion
■ Mode rents loss (approximately) $52 billion
■ Standard deviation: $9.0 billion
■ 95 percent confidence interval ($ billion): [38.8,74.6] 
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Table A3.1  Empirical Values and Assumptions: Stochastic
Specifications
Variable
Point
estimate
Type of
distribution
Standard
deviationa
Implied 95 
percent
confidence
interval
MSY       95     Log-normal 0.03 89.5 to 100.9
Xmax     453     Log-normal 0.1 370.9 to 553.3
x˙(t* )       –2       Normal 3.0 –8 to 4
y(t*)       85.7     Log-normal 0.015 83.2 to 88.3
p(t*)         0.918     Log-normal 0.03 0.865 to 0.975
P(t*)       –5       Normal 2.5 –10 to 0
b         0.7     Log-normal 0.05 0.63 to 0.77
D         0.2     Log-normal 0.1 0.164 to 0.244
e (t*)         0     Log-normal 0.0 0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
a. For lognormal distributions, the standard deviation may be interpreted as an
approximate percentage deviation.
The Combined Models
The difference between the means of the two models appears to be highly sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. Assuming that the two biomass growth functions
are equally likely, the respective stochastic distributions may be combined in
one overall distribution as illustrated in figure A3.3. The crucial outcomes
from this combined model are:
■ Mean rents loss: $51.0 billion
■ Standard deviation: $12.0 billion
■ 95 percent confidence interval ($ billion): [26.3, 72.8]
Calculated Rents and Rents Loss
Two thousand draws from the stochastic distributions described earlier were
taken and the resulting rents and rents loss calculated. The latter is defined as
the difference between the maximum attainable sustainable rents and those
that pertain to the base year (2004). Both the current and the maximum rents
estimates are stochastic. On this basis, the distributions for the outcomes are
derived and confidence intervals calculated. The stochastic specifications for
the empirical assumptions are those listed in table A3.1. 
The key results of the 2,000 draws from the stochastic distributions
described earlier and the resulting rents are summarized in table A3.2 (they are
also shown in table 4.5 in the main text). The distribution of the rents loss is
illustrated in figure A3.4.
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Figure A3.1  Graphical Illustration of Stochastic Simulations Using 
the Logistic Model
Source: Authors’ simulation. 
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Figure A3.2  Graphical Illustration of Fox Model Stochastic Simulations
Source: Authors’ simulation. 
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Figure A3.3  Graphical Illustration of Combined Logistic and Fox Model
Stochastic Simulations
Source: Authors’ simulation. 
Table A3.2  Estimated Rent Loss: Main Results 
(US$ billions)
Current (2004)
Maximum 
sustainable rents Rents loss
Model Mean
95 percent 
confidence
interval
Mean
95 percent
confidence
interval
Mean
95 percent
confidence
interval
Logistic   –5.0 [–10.2, 0.0]       37.6     [4.7, 48.2]     43.0 [20.2, 55.7]
Fox   –5.0 [–10.2, 0.0]       53.4   [41.4, 65.4]     59.0 [38.8, 74.6]
Combined   –5.0 [–10.2, 0.0]       45.3 [38.1, 63.9]     51.0 [26.3, 72.8]
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, the most reasonable estimate of the global rents loss is: 
■ Mean: $51 billion per year
with
■ 95 percent confidence interval ($billion per year): [26.3,72.8] 
■ 90 percent confidence interval ($billion per year): [31.3,69.8]
■ 80 percent confidence interval ($billion per year): [36.5,66.9]
DETAILS OF THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS 
FOR THE INPUT PARAMETERS
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
where MSY ° represents the stochastic maxi-
mum sustainable yield and MSY the point estimate. The random term u1 is
assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ1.
This specification implies that exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the
stochastic simulations it is assumed σ1 = 0.03. This gives rise to the distribu-
tion illustrated in figure A3.4(a). An estimated 5 percent confidence interval
for  million metric tons.
Biomass Carrying Capacity (XMAX)
where XMAX° represents the stochastic
carrying capacity of the global commercial biomass with XMAX as the point
estimate. The random variable u2 is assumed to be normally distributed with
mean zero and standard deviation σ2. This specification implies that XMAX °
exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the stochastic simulations, it is assumed
that σ2 = 0.1. This leads to the distribution illustrated in figure A3.4(b). An
estimated 5 percent confidence interval for XMAX ° is
million metric tons. 
Biomass Growth in Base Year (XDOT)
where XDOT ° represents the stochastic biomass
growth in the base year, and XDOT is the point estimate. The random variable
u3 is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard devia-
tion σ3. This specification implies that XDOT ° exhibits a normal distribution.
In the stochastic simulations, it is assumed that σ3 = 3. This generates the
 distribution illustrated in figure A3.4(c). An approximate 5 percent confidence
interval for XDOT ° is million metric tons. XDOT ° ∈[ 8,4]−
XDOT XDOT u° = + 3 ,
MSY MSY°  ° ∈is [89.5, 100.9]
u N2 2(0, ),∼ σXMAX XMAX e
u
° ⋅= 2 ,
MSY °
MSY MSY e u Nu° ⋅ ∼= , (0, ),1 1 1σ
XMAX° ∈[370.9, 553.3]
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Figure A3.4(a)–(h)  Simulated Distributions
Source: Authors’ simulation.
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Landings in Base Year (Y)
where Y° represents the stochastic landings in the
base year and Y is the point estimate. The random variable u4 is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ4. This specifi-
cation implies that Y ° exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the stochastic
simulations, σ4 = 0.015. This gives rise to the distribution illustrated in figure
A3.4(d). A 5 percent confidence interval for Y ° is million
 metric tons. 
Profits in Base Year (ProfP )
PROF° = PROF + u5, u5 ~ N (0, σ5), where PROF ° represents the stochastic
profits in the base year and PROF the point estimate for these profits. The ran-
dom variable u5 is normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
σ5. This specification implies that PROF° exhibits a normal distribution. In the
stochastic simulations, σ5 = 2.5. This leads to the distribution illustrated in figure
A3.4(e). A 5 percent confidence interval for PROF° is billion $. 
Landings Price (P)
where P° represents the stochastic landings price P,
the point estimate of the landings price, and u6 is assumed to be a normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and standard deviation σ6. This
specification implies that P° exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the stochas-
tic simulations, σ6 = 0.03. This gives rise to the distribution illustrated in
 figure A3.4(f). A 5 percent confidence interval for P° is dol-
lars per kilogram. 
Schooling parameter (b)
where b° represents the stochastic schooling parame-
ter with b being the point estimate. The random variable u7 is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ7. This specifica-
tion implies that b° exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the stochastic simula-
tions, it is assumed that σ7=0.05. This gives rise to the distribution illustrated in
figure A3.4(g). A 5 percent confidence interval for b° is 
Elasticity of Demand (d)
where d° represents the stochastic schooling parame-
ter with d being the point estimate. The random variable u8 is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σ8. This specifica-
tion implies that d° exhibits a lognormal distribution. In the stochastic simula-
tions, it is assumed that σ8 = 0.1. This gives rise to the distribution illustrated in
figure A3.4(h). A 5 percent confidence interval for d° is 
Y Y e u Nu° ⋅ ∼ σ= 2 , (0, ),4 4
d° ∈[0.164, 0.244].
Y ° ∈[83.2, 88.3]
d d e u Nu° ⋅ ∼= 2 , (0, ),8 8σ
P P e u Nu° ⋅ ∼ σ= 6 , (0, ),6 6
PROF° ∈[ 10, 0]−
b° ∈[0.63, 0.77].
b b e u Nu° ⋅ ∼ σ= 2  (0, ),7 7
P° ∈[0.865, 0.975]
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Supplementary Data
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Table A4.2  Selected Examples of Relationship between Estimated
MSY and Biomass Carrying Capacity
Fishery MSY (tons)
Carrying
capacity (tons)
Multiple
(biomass/MSY)
Denmark cod         216         1,443           6.68
Norway cod         602         2,473           4.11
Iceland cod         332         1,988           5.99
Denmark herring         666         4,896           7.35
Norway capelin       2,219         8,293           3.74
Iceland capelin       1,010         3,669           3.63
Bangladesh Hilsa         286         1,084           3.79
Source: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea; FAO.
Table A4.1  Motorized Fishing Fleets in Selected Major Fishing
Countries, 2004
Country/
Economy
Number of 
vessels
China 17 509,717 7,115,194 15,506,720
EU-15 6 85,480 1,882,597 6,941,077
Iceland 2 939 187,079 462,785
Japan 5 313,870 1,304,000 —
Norway 3 8,184 394,846 1,328,945
Republic of Korea 2 87,203 721,398 16,743,102
Russian Federation 3 2,458 1,939,734 2,111,332
Source: China: FAO fishery statistical inquiry; EU-15: Eurostat; Iceland: Statistics
 Iceland (http://www.statice.is); Japan: Japan Statistical Yearbook 2006 (http://www. stat.
go.jp/english/data/nenkan/index.htm); Republic of Korea: Korea Statistical Yearbook 2005
Vol. 52; Norway: Statistics Norway (http://www.ssb.no) and Eurostat; Russian Federa-
tion: FAO fishery statistical inquiry, FAO FishStat; Concerted Action 2004.
Note: Some vessels may not be measured according to the 1969 International Conven-
tion on Tonnage Measurement of Ships. The Icelandic data exclude undecked vessels.
The Japanese data refer to registered fishing vessels operating in marine waters. The
Russian Federation data refer to powered decked vessels with a national license.
*excluding aquatic plants.
Reported 
global 
marine 
catch* (%)
Power 
(kW)
Tonnage
(GT)
Fishing fleet parameters, 2004
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Table A4.3  Estimation of the Weighted Average Global Schooling
Parameter
Species group
Imputed 
MSY (tons)
Schooling
parameter Weighted
Salmons, trouts, smelts     1,016,854       1.00     0.007
Shads   426,754       0.50     0.002
Miscellaneous diadromous fishes   80,134       0.70     0.001
Flounders, halibuts, soles 1,392,052       1.00     0.014
Cods, hakes, haddocks 13,788,742       1.00     0.137
Miscellaneous coastal fishes 6,935,300       1.00     0.069
Miscellaneous demersal fishes 3,162,243       1.00     0.031
Herrings, sardines, anchovies 25,908,711       0.30     0.077
Tunas, bonitos, billfishes 6,243,122       0.60     0.037
Miscellaneous pelagic fishes 14,322,640       0.50     0.071
Sharks, rays, chimaeras   880,785       0.90     0.008
Marine fishes not identified 10,738,831       0.85     0.090
Crabs, sea spiders 1,333,282       0.70     0.009
Lobsters, spiny rock lobsters   233,825       0.70     0.002
King crabs, squatlobsters   163,513       0.70     0.001
Shrimps, prawns 3,478,304       0.80     0.028
Krill, planktonic crustaceans   528,335       0.50     0.003
Miscellaneous marine crustaceans 1,427,312       0.70     0.010
Abalones, winkles, conchs   139,964       1.00     0.001
Oysters   302,526       1.00     0.003
Mussels   317,852       1.00     0.003
Scallops, pectens   804,349       1.00     0.008
Clams, cockles, arkshells 1,129,231       1.00     0.011
Squids, cuttlefishes, octopuses 3,892,145       0.70     0.027
Miscellaneous marine molluscs 1,596,036       0.90     0.014
Sea squirts and other tunicates   21,331       1.00     0.000
Horseshoe crabs and other arachnoids               3,252       1.00     0.000
Sea urchins and other echinoderms   140,461       1.00     0.001
Miscellaneous aquatic invertebrates   539,994       0.90     0.005
TOTAL 100,965,809       n.a.     0.670
Source: MSY values are the historical maximum catches by species group as reported by Fishstat
Plus. The schooling parameters are assumed based on information on schooling parameters for
several indicative species.
n.a. = Not applicable.
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Table A4.4  Indicative Results of Selected Case Studies on Economic Rents in Fisheries
Fishery
Rent/revenue loss as % of base revenues/landed values
SourceBase year Percent Rent or proxy
Vietnam Gulf of Tonkin demersal multigear,
multispecies
            2006           29 rent Nguyen and Nguyen 2008
Icelandic cod demersal multigear, 
multispecies
              2005           55 rent Arnason pers. comm.
Namibian hake trawl             2002         136 rent Sumaila and Marsden 2007
Peruvian anchoveta purse seinea               2006           29 rent Paredes 2008
Bangladesh hilsa artisanal multigear             2005           58 rents
Gulf of Thailand demersal multigear 
multispecies
              1997           42 net revenues Willmann et al. 2003
Yemen lobster, artisanal             2008       1,653 net revenues Shotton pers. comm.
British Columbia salmon fishery               1982           76 rents Dupont 1990
Cyprus fisheries             1984             5 revenue increase Hannesson 1986
Small pelagic fisheries in northwest
Peninsular Malaysia 
        1980–90           79 revenue Tai and Heaps 1996
U.S. Atlantic sea scallop             1995           75 Repetto 2002
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U.S. fisheries               2003         192 net present value Sumaila and Suatoni 2006
New England groundfish             1989         188 rents Edwards and Murawski 1993
Gulf of Mexico shrimp             1990s           50 present value Ward 2006
Western and Central Pacific tuna             1996           59 profit Bertignac et al. 2001
Norwegian trawl               1998         439 rents Ache et al. 2003
Japan coastal squid             2004           77 rents Hoshino and Matsuda 
Japan Pacific saury stick-held dip-net fishery               2004           89 rents 2007 
Lake Victoria Nile perch (freshwater)             2006           61 rents Warui 2008
Danish mussel         2001–03             9 landed value Nielsen et al. 2007
Swedish pelagic fishery         2001–03           50 landed value Nielsen et al. 2007
Faroese pair trawl         2001–03           19 landed value Nielsen et al. 2007
Norwegian coastal (ITQ)         2001–03           40 landed value Nielsen et al. 2007
Note: Values presented refer to different economic indicators and are not necessarily comparable. The table is provided to illustrate the fact that in many
fisheries, substantial additional net benefits can be derived through responsible fisheries management with a focus on economic and social benefits.
a. Economic returns from pelagic fisheries are highly variable and can be heavily influenced by environmental factors or export markets, not merely by
the effectiveness of the management regime.
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Table A4.5  Projection of Rent Loss, 1974–2007 ($ billion) 
Year Percent Index
Rents loss 
(US$
billion) Base
Indexed
2004
Deflated rents
loss by year
(US$ billions)
Cumulative
rents loss at
3.5 percent
(US$ billions)
1974 0.61 0.80     40.5 53.5 0.36         14.8               15
1975a — —     40.5 58.4 0.40         16.1               33
1976 — —     40.5 61.1 0.42         16.9               51
1977 — —     40.5 64.9 0.44         17.9               72
1978 0.59 0.77     39.5 69.9 0.48         18.8               93
1979 0.63 0.82     42.0 78.7 0.54         22.5             120
1980 — —     42.0 89.8 0.61         25.7             151
1981 0.63 0.82     41.8 98 0.67         27.9             185
1982 — —     41.8 100 0.68         28.5             221
1983 0.69 0.91     46.3 101.3 0.69         31.9             262
1984 — —     46.3 103.7 0.71         32.7             305
1985 0.68 0.90     45.7 103.2 0.70         32.1             349
1986 — —     45.7 100.2 0.68         31.2             393
1987 0.69 0.90     45.8 102.8 0.70         32.1             440
1988 —       —     45.8 106.9 0.73         33.3             490
1989 0.69       0.91     46.4 112.2 0.76         35.5             544
1990 0.69       0.90     45.8 116.3 0.79         36.3             601
1991 —       —     45.8 116.5 0.79         36.4             659
1992 0.71       0.93     47.2 117.2 0.80         37.7             721
Global fish stock 
exploitation status
fully + over + depleted Deflatorb
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1993 —       —     47.2 118.9 0.81         38.2             786
1994 —       —     47.2 120.4 0.82         38.7             854
1995 0.70       0.92     47.0 124.7 0.85         39.9             925
1996 —       —     47.0 127.7 0.87         40.9           1,000
1997 0.73       0.96     49.0 127.6 0.87         42.6           1,079
1998 —       —     49.0   124.4       0.85         41.5           1,159
1999 —       —     49.0   125.5       0.86         41.9           1,243
2000 0.75       0.98     48.8   132.7       0.90         44.1           1,333
2001 —       —     48.8   134.2       0.91         44.6           1,425
2002         —       —     48.8   131.1       0.89         43.6 1,520
2002         —       —     48.8   131.1       0.89         43.6 1,520
2003         —       —     48.8   138.1       0.94         45.9 1,621
2004       0.76       1.00     51.0   146.7       1.00         51.0 1,731
2005         —       —     51.0   157.4       1.07         54.7 1,848
2006         —       —     51.0   164.7       1.12         57.3 1,972
2007         —       —     51.0   172.6       1.18         60.0 2,103
2008         —       —     51.0     —       1.18         60.0 2,239
Source: FAO State of Marine Fisheries (year for which stock status is available indicated in bold).
Note: Section 4.1. in the main text indicates how the calculations in this table were made. — Data are not available. Base years for indexes 
are shown in italic.
a. Because the FAO’s assessment of the state of marine fish stocks is not available for certain years, values from preceding year are used.
b. The deflator is that used by the U.S. Labor Department for all commodities.
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Figure A4.1  Example of Increasing Rents in New Zealand 
and Icelandic Fisheries
Source: (a) PROFISH Team, World Bank, based on New Zealand deepwater fishery monetary
stock accounts; (b) Authors.
Note: The quota share value is used as a proxy for rents.
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